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Abstract 
We examine the impact of financial distress conditions at the individual firm level, the operating 
industry level, and economy-wide, on the stock price reaction to divestment announcements. This 
allows us to isolate distinct fire sale and financing theoretical explanations of asset divestments. We 
find that abnormal returns are significantly lower when firms divest assets during periods of 
industry-wide distress. During these periods the natural buyers of the divested assets are likely to 
have liquidity constraints, and so selling firms receive a lower price (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Fire 
sale effects from divestments are driven by financially constrained firms, firms selling core assets, 
small firms, and increase with deal size. We find some support for the financing explanation of the 
stock price response to divestments during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide 
financial distress conditions, suggesting that divesting assets reduce the expected value of bankruptcy 
costs for selling firms under these conditions. 
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 1. Introduction  
The evidence that activity in the market for asset divestitures, and control of corporate assets 
more generally, varies significantly over time and across industries is one of the most consistent in 
corporate finance research.1 Time-series variation in activity can arise as a result of changes in the 
cost structure of an industry, changes in the relative valuation of bidder and target firms, and as a 
result of financial distress conditions, which are the focus of this study (Harford, 2005; Maksimovic 
and Phillips, 1998; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).  
There are two main competing financial distress related hypotheses on the stock price 
reaction to asset divestments. The financing hypothesis proposes a positive stock price response to 
the divestment announcement, given the proceeds of the sale can reduce the expected costs of 
bankruptcy (e.g. Asquith et al., 1994; Lang et al., 1995). Under this theory, firms choose to sell assets 
when divestments represent a lower cost source of financing than raising debt or equity and the cash 
injection to the firm has a higher present value than retaining control of the divested assets. The 
literature on financing benefits traditionally focuses on asset sales by divestors experiencing financial 
distress at the individual firm-level (e.g. Ofek, 1993; Denis and Shome, 2005). 
An alternative view is that when distress conditions impact on many firms simultaneously a 
negative stock price reaction to divestments is expected. For example, when distress conditions 
impact on all firms in an industry, the highest potential bidders are less likely to be in a position to 
acquire the divested assets, which increases the likelihood of asset purchases at distressed prices by 
non-industry acquirers. We refer to this as the fire sale explanation of divestments where distressed 
firms under pressure from creditors are forced to sell assets at a substantial discount to their 
fundamental value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Empirical tests of this theory have traditionally 
focused on industry-wide distress rather than firm or economy-wide distress.  
                                                
1 See Duchin and Schmidt (2013), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), and Mulherin and Boone (2000).  
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In this study we examine how the market reaction to announcements of asset divestments 
varies with firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide financial distress conditions to allow us to 
isolate the distinct theoretical predictions of these two models. The two divestment reaction theories 
have not typically focused on the impact of economy-wide distress conditions on the price received, 
and therefore the stock price response to divestment announcements is less examined and more 
ambiguous. As with industry-wide distress, economy-wide distress will lead to a reduction in asset 
value given lower current and expected future profitability from the firm’s assets (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992). However, financing benefits can still accrue to divesting firms when there are a 
sufficient number of potential acquirers and the theories make distinct predictions regarding 
divestment of core and non-core assets that vary between industry-wide and economy-wide distress. 
We propose that financial distress conditions facing the divesting firm, external market 
conditions, and the resulting availability of potential buyers for the divested assets are key 
determinants of the stock price response to divestment announcements. The financing hypothesis 
can explain a positive market reaction to divestments when there are sufficient high value buyers of 
the divested asset. However, when an increasing number firms seek to sell off assets at precisely the 
point when liquidity constrains are concentrated amongst the natural buyers of the divested assets 
the divesting firm is forced to either postpone the sale or accept a bid below the fundamental value 
of the assets. Under such conditions, the fire sales hypothesis predicts a lower stock price response 
to divestment announcements. Fire sale discounts are expected to be greatest when firms sell core 
assets to non-industry acquirers, who are identified as low value users of the divested assets in the 
fire sale literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
These conflicting arguments on fire sale costs and financing benefits and giving full 
consideration of the impact of different distress conditions on these theories motivates our paper. 
We aim to identify distinct periods of firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide financial distress 
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conditions, and periods when they overlap, to better isolate individual divestments most likely to be 
subject to fire sale costs and financing benefits. We argue that it is important to accurately define 
financial distress as either one of firm-level, industry- and economy-wide or combinations of them. 
Otherwise it is difficult to accurately identify which of these effects will be more dominant in 
explaining the stock price response to asset divestments. 
A number of studies have empirically confirmed the presence of fire sale discounts for small 
samples of homogeneous asset sales during periods of industry-wide distress.2 We extend this 
evidence for a large sample of heterogeneous asset divestments, and importantly across a range of 
divesting firm characteristics and financial distress conditions.3 Borisova et al. (2013) point out that 
the opaque nature of the bidding process for divested assets increases the importance of firm-level 
and economy-wide factors in understanding the stock price reaction to divestment announcements. 
Therefore we examine firm-level and transaction characteristics, and how they vary across our three 
financial distress conditions to influence the stock price response to divestment announcements. 
We examine these issues through an event study analysis of the stock price reaction to asset 
divestment announcements for 10,718 sales by non-financial UK firms from 1988 to 2009, 
comparing the reaction to divestments by firms during our three definitions of distress to non-
distressed (healthy) firms. This sample period allows us to isolate specific distress conditions as it 
covers two recessions in 1990/91 and 2008/09, the stock market crashes associated with media and 
tech stocks in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2008, and significant variation in industry-wide 
and firm-level distress conditions.  
                                                
2 For example, for commercial aircraft (Benmelech and Bergman 2008; Gavazza, 2010), contract drilling equipment 
(Kim, 1998), real estate (Campbell et al., 2011), automatic bankruptcy auctions (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008), and mutual 
fund withdrawals (Coval and Stafford, 2007) 
3 Borisova et al. (2013) argue that in a large heterogeneous sample, examining abnormal returns for selling firms 
surrounding the divestment announcement serves as an indicator of the value received. This circumvents the difficulties 
in estimating the intrinsic value of divested assets across a large sample of unlisted assets. 
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Our study contributes to research on financial distress and asset divestments in two key 
areas. First, we directly test competing financing and fire sale explanations that lead to differing 
predictions on the stock price reaction to divestment announcements and by more precisely defining 
conditions of financial distress under which each effect is likely to be dominant. The literature has 
defined distress using a number of firm-level measures (Clayton and Reisel, 2013; John et al., 1992), 
industry-wide measures (Acharya et al., 2007; Schlingemann et al., 2002), economy-wide measures 
(Campbell et al., 2008; Kahl, 2002), and combinations thereof. However, to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first paper to examine how the stock price response to divestment 
announcements varies with each set of distress conditions in isolation, and also their interaction.  
Second, we extend prior literature on fire sale conditions to a larger, more heterogeneous, 
group of divesting firms, industries, and divested assets. Doing so allows us to exploit variation in 
distress and non-distressed conditions, and across divesting firm and deal characteristics, to directly 
compare investor perceptions of divestment announcements across financial distress conditions. 
We provide empirical evidence that divestments made during periods of industry-wide 
distress, commonly associated with fire sale discounts, elicit a significantly lower stock price 
response. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that under such conditions assets are more likely to be 
sold to low value non-industry users that will pay a lower purchase price. However, firm-level 
distress mitigates the lower response for industry-wide distressed sellers. These results suggest that 
fire sale conditions prevail when firms divest assets during periods of industry-wide distress, but that 
the financing benefits at the firm level can offset the fire sale discount. 
Our examination of asset divestments during fire sale conditions highlights firm and deal 
characteristics that drive the stock price reaction to divestment announcements. Fire sale costs are 
restricted to the following sub-samples of divesting firms: (i) financially constrained firms with 
limited debt capacity who are likely to have been forced to divest under pressure from creditors, (ii) 
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firms specifically selling the core assets expected to suffer liquidity discounts, (iii) firms selling assets 
to non-industry acquirers that may require bigger liquidity discounts to purchase the divested assets, 
and (iv) small firms expected to have limited access to external capital market funding as an 
alternative to divesting assets. Fire sale costs increase with the relative size of the divested asset, 
again suggesting liquidity discounts for the sale of larger assets.  
We find evidence in support of the financing hypothesis that asset sales are more beneficial 
to firm stockholders during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide distress. We find 
that divested assets are more likely to be purchased by non-industry acquirers during economy-wide 
distress periods. Financing benefits to asset divestments during periods of economy-wide distress 
reflect imperfect correlation of distress conditions across industries and the availability of non-
distressed acquiring firms outside of the divesting firms’ industry. These effects are greatest when 
the divesting firm simultaneously experiences financial distress and/or is likely to be facing financial 
constraints in accessing external capital and the divested asset are purchased by acquirers operating 
in a different industry.  
Collectively, these findings highlight the importance of precisely defining financial distress 
conditions for understanding investor perceptions of restructuring transactions. Our findings also 
highlight that prior evidence on the role of financial distress conditions in the market response to 
asset divestments can under or overstate the financing benefits and fire sale costs of divestments 
depending on the relative frequency of overlapping distress conditions during the sample period.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we summarize prior 
literature on financial distress conditions and the stock price reaction to asset divestments and 
develop our empirical hypotheses. Section 3 outlines sample construction, variable definitions and 
research method. Section 4 presents our empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
Empirical research on asset divestments finds that, on average, asset sales are associated with 
significant increases in stockholder wealth. A positive response is more often observed when the 
divestment is associated with an improved focus on core assets of the selling firm (John and Ofek, 
1995) and the cash proceeds are used to pay-off debt holders rather than retained within the firm 
(Bates, 2005; Lang et al., 1995).  
In this paper we focus specifically on firms experiencing financial distress who raise cash 
through asset sales. This is important as in non-distressed conditions the market for the divested 
asset could be liquid and buyers easy to find for the divesting firm and so they are able to sell the 
assets for a price close to the fundamental value (Schlingemann et al., 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992). We expect the stock price response to differ for distressed firms and the direction of this 
difference to reflect competing financing and fire sales effects. 
Financing theories of asset sales propose that divestments allow the selling firm to obtain 
access to external financing that can otherwise be difficult, especially if the firm is experiencing 
financial distress. Asset sales can reduce the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy where the cash 
received from the disposal reduces the probability of bankruptcy and the sale price achieved is close 
to the fundamental value of the asset. In such cases a positive stock price response to divestment 
announcements can be expected when the divestor is experiencing firm-level financial distress 
because the divestment represents good news about the price received for the asset (Lang et al., 
1995) and the proceeds can be used to reduce the probability of bankruptcy (Lasfer et al., 1996).  
The fire sale explanation of divestments suggests that a need to finance liabilities falling due 
forces firms to sell assets in illiquid markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 2011). As such, the value 
received for asset sales is expected to be lower than during non-distressed periods for two reasons: 
(i) the present value of cash flows generated by the asset will decline with industry- and economy-
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wide conditions and (ii) even at this lower fundamental value, sellers must offer a liquidity discount 
to induce low-value users to bid for the asset. During fire sale conditions, the stock price response to 
divestment announcements will be discounted relative to healthy firms because the announcement 
conveys new information about both the value of the divested asset and the price received, and this 
can outweigh the firm-level financing benefits from the divestment. 
In this section we discuss the impact of financial distress conditions on both the propensity 
to sell assets and the stock price response to divestment announcements. The competing financing 
and fire sale theories traditionally rely on different definitions of financial distress and the literature 
is limited in its discussion of economy-wide and overlapping distress conditions. 
 
2.1. Firm-level distress 
The financing hypothesis of asset sales has in the past literature been most closely associated 
with financial distress for individual firms. A firm experiencing an idiosyncratic performance shock 
and a resulting cash shortfall is likely to sell assets when the cost of raising new finance through 
security issuance proves prohibitive (Lang et al., 1995). Since fire sales are associated with a 
concentration of firms divesting assets within a short time frame, financial distress conditions for 
individual firms in isolation are unlikely to be associated with fire sale discounts. 
Consistent with the financing hypothesis, Ofek (1993) and Denis and Shome (2005) show a 
higher incidence of asset divestments for firms that experience poor performance and have higher 
leverage, and therefore could find external financing opportunities limited and/or expensive. 
Abnormal returns to sell off announcements are therefore expected to be higher for sellers 
experiencing firm-level distress because the announcement signals a price received that is in excess 
of the cost of raising additional funding (Clayton and Reisel, 2013) and a reduction in the present 
value of bankruptcy costs (Lasfer et al., 1996).  
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Lang et al. (1995) find a positive stock price response to divestments motivated by the 
financing hypothesis where sale proceeds represent a source of finance that would otherwise be 
difficult to obtain. Afshar et al. (1992) and Lasfer et al. (1996) find higher gains for divestment 
announcements by financially distressed UK firms. Bates (2005) and Clayton and Reisel (2013) find 
that announcement returns to divestments increase with leverage ratios, and where the proceeds are 
used to repay debt, which indicates a reduction in the expected value of bankruptcy costs for these 
firms.  
Brown et al. (1994) provide evidence that is apparently contrary to the firm-level financing 
benefits of asset sales. They find that abnormal returns are significantly lower for distressed firms 
who use the proceeds to retire debt relative to distressed firms that cite other uses for the 
divestment proceeds. They argue that such divestments are more beneficial to the firm’s creditors 
than stockholders. However, in their research financial distress is defined using information 
contained in the asset sale announcement and the divestments in their sample are more likely to 
represent forced sell-offs that can be better explained by the fire sale hypothesis.4  
Therefore, we follow the theoretical prediction of the financing theory and the main 
empirical evidence and propose the following hypothesis for divestment announcements during 
firm-level distress: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Stock price response is significantly higher for asset divestments during firm-level 
distress. 
 
                                                
4 Their findings are based on a small sample of 62 asset sales by distressed firms, do not distinguish between 
distressed and healthy firms, and are limited to very specific cases that explicitly cite the need to sell assets in order to 
pay off an existing or anticipated default, restructure debt, or to avoid bankruptcy as the motivation for the asset 
divestment. Given the specific definition of financial distress these divestment announcements are likely to contain new 
information on the selling firm’s financial difficulties, and as a result it is difficult to isolate the fire sale effect of a forced 
sale at a distressed price from any financing benefit to the intended use of proceeds. 
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2.2. Industry-wide distress 
In developing the fire sale hypothesis, Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011) propose that liquidity 
discounts for divested assets are more likely to arise under conditions of industry-wide distress. 
Industry-wide distress can lead to a lower price received for assets sold for two complimentary 
reasons: (i) the decline in industry conditions reduces the present value of cash flows from operating 
the asset, and (ii) the selling firm must offer liquidity discounts to make the assets attractive to 
potential buyers (Acharya et al., 2007).  
Under the fire sale theory, industry competitors represent the highest value users of an asset 
and therefore should be willing to offer the highest price to the divesting firm. However, when the 
performance shock affects all firms in an industry then competitor firms experience the same short-
term liquidity constraints and long-term debt overhang problems faced by the selling firm and are 
unable to offer the seller’s minimum price for the asset. This increases the likelihood of asset 
purchases by non-industry firms who are only willing to buy the assets at lower valuations.  
A negative price reaction to a divestment announcement for firms experiencing industry-
wide distress most likely reflects both new information on the severity of the localized financial 
distress conditions within the industry and the resulting reduction in asset values, and price 
discounts offered to attract a buyer (Marshall et al., 2012). Financing benefits can still exist for 
divestments made during industry-wide distress conditions, but the stock price response to the 
divestment announcement is expected to be lower in comparison to firm-level distress conditions 
given these fire sale costs. 
Industry-wide distress conditions are expected to impact both the likelihood of asset 
divestments and the price received for divested assets. Asquith et al. (1994), Pulvino (1998), and 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that divestments are more likely in industries that have liquid 
markets for asset sales. Ramey and Shapiro (2001) find evidence of fire sale discounts in a sample of 
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divestments by US aerospace firms. Acharya et al. (2007) find that industry conditions are a key 
determinant of recovery values following firm defaults. Marshall et al. (2012) find a significantly 
negative response to layoff announcements during the global financial crisis, which is most 
pronounced for firms in financial services industries. 
The above evidence supports the relative importance of the fire sales hypothesis during 
periods of industry-wide distress when firms are forced to sell core assets to non-industry acquirers 
and at a price below fundamental value. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Stock price response is significantly lower for asset divestments during industry-wide 
distress. 
 
2.3. Economy-wide distress  
The impact of economy-wide distress conditions on the market reaction to asset divestment 
announcements is less well understood empirically, and as it has not been the primary focus of the 
competing financing and fire sale theories, is subject to greater ambiguity theoretically.  
Although much of the empirical research on fire sales has focused on industry-wide distress, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose that fire sale effects would also be prevalent during economy-
wide distress periods. They propose that when the economy is distressed there are many potential 
industries that have to compete for the financing provided by deep pocketed purchasers of 
distressed firms’ assets. This creates fire sale conditions for divesting firms and would be associated 
with a lower stock price response to divestment announcements.  
Financing benefits can also be expected during a period of economy-wide distress. Given 
less than perfect correlation of financial distress conditions across industries and economies, 
Borisova et al. (2013) propose that a foreign buyer is able to pay a higher price for divested assets in 
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comparison to financially distressed domestic competitors. We extend this line of reasoning to 
propose a potential financing benefit to asset purchases by non-industry buyers during periods of 
economy-wide distress. As long as the economic shock is less than perfectly positively correlated 
across industries within a single country there can be a potential pool of non-industry buyers that do 
not suffer financial distress and who therefore can bid up the price of the divested assets to reduce 
or eliminate the liquidity discount associated with fire sale conditions. If this is the case, financing 
benefits during economy-wide distress are driven by asset purchases made by non-industry acquirers 
of the divested assets. Of course, this financing benefit can exist and potentially be stronger during 
periods of industry-wide distress. During industry-wide, but not economy-wide distress, there is 
expected to be a greater pool of non-industry firms in a position of financial strength to acquire the 
divesting firm’s assets. Therefore, we propose three distinguishing features of the financing benefits 
and fire sale costs to divestments that we expect to differ between economy-wide distress relative 
industry-wide distress.  
First, external debt and equity capital can be more easily accessed during periods of localized 
industry-wide distress. Therefore financing benefits to asset divestments are expected to be stronger 
during economy-wide distress. Second, we separately examine divestments of core and non-core 
assets. Fire sale costs during industry-wide distress are expected to be greatest surrounding the 
disposal of those core assets suffering industry-wide distress, whereas financing benefits under both 
industry-wide and economy-wide distress accrue to the disposal of both core and non-core assets. 
Third, we examine the operating industry of the firm acquiring the divested assets. We expect that 
industry-wide distress reduces the likelihood of divestment to non-industry acquirers and that any 
divestments to non-industry acquiring firms must be made at significant discounts to fundamental 
values to attract a buyer. The impact of buyer identity on the stock price response to asset 
divestments during economy-wide distress is more ambiguous. The fire sale theory predicts that 
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unrelated buyers place a lower value on the acquired assets, whereas financing benefits under 
economy-wide distress are expected to be greater if competitive bidding by non-industry acquiring 
firms increases the price received for the divested assets. 
As with industry-wide distress, economy-wide distress will lead to a reduction in asset values 
given lower current and expected future profitability from the firm’s assets. However, since a 
recession is general to all firms in the economy we do not expect the divestment announcement to 
convey specific and negative information on the value of the divesting firm’s assets. Therefore, the 
stock price reaction to the divestment announcement reflects new information on the price received 
for the asset and any financing benefits at the firm-level given difficulties in accessing external capital 
markets during a period of economy-wide distress (Borisova et al., 2013).  
Empirical research on the likelihood of divestment, the price received, and the stock price 
response to asset sale announcements during economy-wide distress is also limited. Campello et al. 
(2010) show that financially constrained managers are more likely to sell off assets during the 
financial crisis of 2008. Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) find that firms announcing asset 
divestments during a recession experience higher abnormal returns relative to firms announcing 
during periods of economic growth. They attribute this to economy-wide distress forcing firms to 
divest poorly performing subsidiaries that lack strategic fit with the core assets of a firm. During 
periods of economic health such pressures are less prevalent. Similarly, Ang and Mauck (2011) find 
higher premiums in merger transactions during periods of economy-wide distress. Acharya et al. 
(2007) find no relation between economic conditions and value received from creditor recoveries.  
Given ambiguity in the relative importance of the financing and fire sale hypotheses of asset 
divestments under economy-wide distress conditions we propose competing hypotheses for its 
relative impact on stock price returns surrounding divestment announcements: 
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Hypothesis 3a. Stock price response is significantly higher for asset divestments made during 
economy-wide distress. 
Hypothesis 3b. Stock price response is significantly lower for asset divestments made during 
economy-wide distress. 
 
2.4. Interaction of financial distress conditions  
In this section we extend our focus on financial distress to consider the overlap of firm-level, 
industry-wide, and economy-wide distress conditions that are expected to give rise to competing 
financing benefits and fire sale costs to the asset divestment. We suggest that the importance of 
specific distress conditions is expected to impact on the market response to asset divestment 
announcements. If the financing benefits dominate, we expect a positive market response to the 
announcement. If the fire sale costs dominate, we expect a negative market response. 
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that industry-wide conditions are more important than 
firm-level conditions in explaining asset sale and plant closure decisions at bankrupt firms. Kruse 
(2002) finds that divestments are more likely when the market for asset sales is liquid and selling 
firms are not financially constrained. Pulvino (1998) finds that aircraft sales by financially 
constrained firms are made at a discount only when the overall airline industry is distressed. This is 
driven by an increase in the likelihood of selling assets to low value non-industry acquirers. Eckbo 
and Thorburn (2008) find fire sale discounts in automatic bankruptcy auctions when the industry is 
suffering financial distress. In contrast, Ang and Mauck (2011) find that merger premiums to 
financially distressed firms are actually higher during periods of economic distress.  
This summary of prior literature highlights the importance of identifying distinct financial 
distress conditions, in isolation and in combination, to understand the expected stock price response 
to asset divestments. However, given the numerous possible combinations of distress conditions we 
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do not propose formal hypotheses. We do note that conditions where fire sales are expected to be 
more prominent can lead to a less positive assessment of asset divestments. 
 
3. Data and research method 
3.1. Sample construction 
The sample of asset divestments is collected from SDC Platinum over the 22-year period 
from January 1988 to December 2009 for firms with their primary listing on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). We collect the announcement date and other supplementary information including 
industry designation of the divested asset and the parent firm from this database. This produces an 
initial sample of 16,684 divestment announcements.  
We exclude financial and utility firms given their regulatory environment and government 
backing during the financial crisis.5 We also exclude announcements by firms in Datastream level 6 
industries with fewer than five firms to improve accuracy of industry-wide distress measures. We 
also exclude firms with missing or zero stock returns data for each day in the estimation and event 
windows. We retain only announcements by firms in the FTSE All-Share Index in the six months 
prior to the divestment announcement. This is to ensure the accuracy of the reported event dates by 
focusing on listed firms that receive greater media coverage. Focusing on firms in the All-Share 
Index also allows for more accurate measurement of firm-level financial distress conditions.6 We 
collect data on the FTSE All-Share Index constituents from Worldscope and the London Business 
                                                
5 For example, UK Government backing of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group led the European 
Union competition commissioner to force asset divestments at these firms under regulations governing the provision of 
state aid. These divestments remain ongoing at the time of writing, several years after receipt of government funding and 
outside of the immediate industry distress conditions experienced during 2008. 
6 Kruse (2002) and Schlingemann et al. (2002) impose similar restrictions to identify divesting firms. We expect that 
smaller and younger firms are more likely to generate operating losses and rely on access to external capital markets to 
finance their operating losses in the early years after listing (DeAngelo et al., 2010). Financial distress prediction models 
that rely on poor accounting performance to identify distress are expected to be less accurate for these firms.  
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School Risk Measurement Service. These filters produce a final sample of 10,718 divestment 
announcements.7  
 
3.2. Financial distress conditions and control variables 
We define financial distress at the firm, industry and economy level using a series of dummy 
variables that capture performance. This allows us to identify shocks to performance and cash flows 
that affect the incentives of firm to divest. Acharya et al. (2007) show that the effect of distress on 
the incentive to restructure is non-linear and therefore we use dummy variables, rather than 
continuous performance measures, to identify poor performance. 
We follow Bhagat et al. (2005) and John et al. (1992) and define firm distress (FIRM) where 
the divesting firm has reported negative net income for the financial year prior to the divestment 
announcement. Negative net income is an important event given the tendency for managers to 
attempt to smooth reported accounting income.8 
Several prior studies on industry-wide distress focus their definition on poor stock price 
performance alone (Gilson et al., 1990; Ofek, 1993; Opler and Titman, 1994). However, Acharya et 
al. (2007) find that supplementing stock price returns with declining firm revenues improves the 
predictive power of their industry-wide distress variable by 40%. Controlling for historical 
                                                
7 Although we focus on FTSE All-Share index constituents, our sample is not limited to very large firms. The size of 
firms in our sample is smaller in comparison to those examined in Borisova et al. (2013) and Clayton and Reisel (2013) 
(comparison is approximate  given differences in exchange rates over time). The mean (median) market capitalization of 
our sample firms is £4,633m (£445m). The corresponding figures for deal value are £81.98m (£8.66m). Mean (median) 
market capitalization in Borisova et al. (2013) is $14,506m ($1,909m) and $299.8m ($55m) for deal value based on firms 
selling assets to domestic buyers, which are insignificantly different from those firms selling assets to cross-border 
buyers. Clayton and Reisel (2013) set a minimum deal value of $75m for their sample of divestments, and as a result their 
sample contains larger firms than in Borisova et al. (2013) and this study. Thus, despite our focus on FTSE All-Share 
Index constituents, our sample is unlikely to be significantly biased towards very large firms in comparison to prior 
studies.  
8 Our results are robust to alternative definitions of firm financial distress. Following Asquith et al. (1994) we also 
define financial distress using a low interest coverage dummy variable set equal to one where the divesting firm has a 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total interest expense of less 
than 0.8 in the year prior to the divestment announcement or below 1.0 for two consecutive years prior to the 
announcement. Our results are also robust to defining financially distressed firms using the Taffler z-score for UK firms 
(Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). 
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performance using revenues alongside stock return performance is also important to avoid look-
ahead bias in our measure of industry-wide distress. As such, we define industry-wide distress using 
both the measures proposed by Acharya et al. (2007) where firstly, industry-wide distress is based on 
poor stock price performance alone (IND 1), and secondly poor stock price performance and 
negative revenue growth for the median firm in the same Datastream level 6 industry group as the 
divesting firm in the year prior to the divestment (IND 2).  
We define economy-wide distress (ECON) using the UK Governments’ Treasury definition 
of two or more consecutive quarters of declining real gross domestic product. The UK experienced 
two recessions during our sample period; one lasting for five quarters from Q3 1990 and a second 
recession associated with the global financial crisis lasting for six quarters from Q2 2008.  
Also in our regression analysis we control for a range of additional firm and divestment 
characteristics that are expected to be correlated with announcement returns of divesting firms. We 
expect that firm size (FSIZE) is negatively related to announcement returns. This can arise where 
larger firms have better access to capital markets (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) and are therefore 
less likely to benefit from a reduction in financing constraints from divestments. Growth 
opportunities (MTB) can be positively related to announcement returns if returns are higher for 
firms with good investment opportunities to reinvest the cash received from the disposal (Bates, 
2005). We expect that related divestments (RELATE) are associated with lower abnormal returns 
given the gains to reversing diversification through asset disposals (John and Ofek, 1995). Industry 
liquidity conditions can also affect the likelihood of selling core relative to non-core assets 
(Schlingemann et al., 2002). We also include a repeat divestments dummy (CLUSTER) for frequent 
divestors. Stand-alone or infrequent divestment announcements are expected to convey more 
information to the market and we expect this variable to be negatively correlated with abnormal 
returns (Berger and Ofek, 1999). Alternatively, firms undertaking multiple divestments are amongst 
17 
 
the most financially distressed and should benefit to a greater extent from any reduction in the 
expected costs of financial distress. Sample firms are matched to Worldscope to collect accounting 
data at the financial year-end prior to the divestment. In our main regressions this matching further 
reduces the sample size to 9,713 observations.9   
In further sub-sample testing we examine the effect of low debt capacity and deal size on 
abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements. In the fire sale model of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) firms with low debt capacity are more likely to be forced to sell assets at prices below 
their fundamental value. Following Pulvino (1998) we include a low debt capacity dummy (CAPLO) 
for firms that have book leverage above the industry median and a current ratio below the industry 
median.10 We anticipate that deal size (DSIZE) is positively related to announcement returns given 
the financing benefits from larger divestments (Lang et al., 1995). Deal characteristics are collected 
from the SDC record of the announcement. The inclusion of CAPLO and DSIZE reduces the 
number of observations in our regression analysis to 7,996 and 6,098 respectively.  
Panel A of Table 1 describes our financial distress measures associated with the financing 
and fire sale hypotheses. Panel B presents the definitions of our control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the number of divestment transactions classed as financially distressed. Panel 
A reports the number of divestment transactions over time for the full sample and across financial 
distress conditions and Panel B reports the number of transactions taking place during overlapping 
                                                
9 To remove the effect of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom 0.5% of all observations for our control 
variables.  
10 Following Pulvino (1998) we use book, rather than market, leverage to define low debt capacity firms. This avoids 
conflating financing constraints with the performance shock that we use to identify financial distress conditions since the 
performance shock will be correlated with changes in the market leverage ratio. 
18 
 
distress conditions separately for our IND 1 and IND 2 measures. We also report the breakdown of 
divestments across Datastream level 6 industry groups in Appendix A, which highlights industry 
years classified as distressed during our sample time period.  
Following general trends in merger activity, Table 2 shows a reduction in divestment activity 
in the last decade of our sample, following a peak in the late 1990s (Ang and Mauck, 2011; Duchin 
and Schmidt, 2013). Approximately two thirds of our sample does not experience any distress 
conditions at the time of the divestment announcement. For these firms, strategic motives, including 
the fit of the divested asset, are more likely to motivate the divestment. We address these motives in 
our regression models through the control variables. 
Divestments during periods of industry-wide and economy-wide distress are less frequent 
than during firm distress conditions. IND 1 divestments are concentrated during two recessionary 
periods (1990/91 and 2008/09) and the collapse of media and technology stocks in 2001/2002. The 
largest group of divestments by IND 2 distressed firms also occurs in 2001/2002 in media and 
technology related industries. Home construction and automobile industries also experience distress 
in the early 1990s and industry-wide distress associated with the global financial crisis in 2008 is 
dispersed across a number of industry groups including metals, machinery, home construction, 
industrial services, medical equipment and supplies, clothing and apparel, and publishing.11 There is a 
noticeable increase in divestment activity during periods of economy-wide distress relative to the 
years immediately preceding a recession, which supports the financing hypothesis. This difference 
highlights the importance in this paper of considering divestment activity under both industry-wide 
and economy-wide distress conditions. There appears to be distinctive features of industry-wide 
distress periods that explain the slowdown in divestments – under the fire sale hypothesis this can 
                                                
11 Unlike the US, the UK did not enter a formal recession in 2001/2002 and therefore this period is not classified as 
experiencing economy-wide distress for our sample firms. 
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arise due to a lack of potential buyers for these assets – from economy-wide distress conditions that 
lead to a relative increase in divestment activity. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 Panel A also highlights connections between our three measures of financial distress. 
Divesting firms are more likely to operate in distressed industries and have negative net income 
during recessionary periods. However, we do observe distinct periods of industry-wide and 
economy-wide distress and a recurring, albeit less frequent, number of divestments by distressed 
firms during each year of our sample period. This allows us to differentiate these effects in our 
empirical tests. We examine this issue in more detail in Panel B, which shows a clear overlap 
between industry-wide distress and both firm-level and economy-wide distress conditions. 58% 
(45%) of industry-wide distress divestments take place at firms simultaneously experiencing at least 
firm-level or economy-wide distress conditions for our IND 1 (IND 2) definition. This highlights 
the importance of precisely isolating financial distress conditions in understanding the stock price 
response to divestments. The proportion of divestments that take place during firm-level and 
economy-wide distress conditions in isolation is higher than for industry-wide distress, suggesting 
that these are more likely to represent discrete and idiosyncratic events at the time of the 
announcement.  
 
3.3. Event study 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for our divestment announcements using 
an estimation period from 190 to 31 days prior to the announcement date. Market model parameters 
are estimated with the FTSE All-Share Index as the market benchmark and t-tests of average CARs 
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are calculated using the standard deviation of abnormal returns (ARs) from the estimation period. 
We report event study CARs over the three-day window from day -1 to day +1 relative to the 
announcement date, day zero.12 
  
4. Stock price response to asset divestments and financial distress 
4.1. Summary statistics 
We now examine how firm and deal characteristics differ across financial distress conditions 
in a manner that can influence the motivation for the divestment, and therefore, potentially affect 
the stock price response to divestment announcements. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for 
firm and deal characteristics between distressed and non-distressed divestment firms. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Panel A separates divestments by firm-level distress. It shows distressed firms are larger than 
non-distressed firms and have weaker growth opportunities. We find no relation between firm-level 
financial distress and deal size, the likelihood of selling core assets, clustering of divestment activity, 
or the likelihood of being classified as a low debt capacity firm.  
Panels B and C separate divestments according to our two industry-wide distress measures, 
IND 1 in Panel B and IND 2 in Panel C. We find industry-wide distressed firms are smaller based 
on sample medians and divestments represent a larger fraction of the firm’s assets. CAPLO is 
unrelated to divestment activity across both measures of industry-wide distress. The mean FSIZE 
and MTB are higher, but this is driven by a small number of divestments by the largest firms in our 
                                                
12 The results presented in this paper are robust to wider event windows that can address concerns that divestments 
could contain information about the overall prospects of the divesting firm, which contaminates any financing or fire 
sale inferences contained in the immediate stock price response. Our results also hold for the two-day event window 
from day -1 to day 0 surrounding the announcement. 
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sample. For the IND 1 distress group we find that divestors are more likely to sell core assets, which 
are likely to be those most subject to liquidity discounts given financial difficulties at industry 
competitors. IND 1 sellers are also less likely to make multiple divestments, but this finding does 
not hold for the more restrictive IND 2 measure of industry-wide distress.  
Finally, Panel D separates divestments by economy-wide distress conditions. We find no 
difference in firm size or deal size between distressed and non-distressed conditions. Unsurprisingly 
growth opportunities are lower during a recession. Divestments made during these periods are more 
likely to involve core assets and divesting firms are more likely to have low debt capacity.  
Overall, firms selling assets during firm-level and industry-wide distress conditions tend to be 
larger than the average divesting firm in our sample. Although we find that divestments during 
industry-wide distress are no more likely to be driven by low debt capacity, the finding that 
divestments during industry-wide distress periods are larger suggests that assets representing a higher 
proportion of firm value are being sold when fire sale conditions and a lack of industry buyers are 
most prevalent. The combined propensity to sell core assets and high firm-level financing difficulties 
during periods of economy-wide distress likely reflects a strong financing benefit to divestments 
during a recession. 
 
4.2. Financial distress conditions and stock price response to asset divestments 
As a brief precursor to our main analysis, in Table 4 we present univariate sorts of CARs 
partitioned between non-distressed and distressed firms. It shows the three-day CAR is significantly 
positive for all four groups of non-distressed firms and ranges from 0.74% to 0.94%. Similar levels 
of abnormal results are found by Borisova et al. (2013) and Sicherman and Pettway (1992). This 
positive announcement reaction supports theories of divestment based on operating efficiency for 
the selling firm and improved fit with the buyer.  
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In terms of our main analysis we find an average CAR of 1.05% (significant at the 1% level) 
for divestment announcements during firm-level financial distress conditions. The results are larger 
than those for non-distressed firms, but the difference in returns between non-distressed and 
distressed firms is not significant. As such, our findings do not support hypothesis 1 and the 
financing explanation of the market reaction to divestments. These results reject fire sales as the 
main explanation of the stock price response to asset divestments by distressed firms. Therefore, we 
suggest that any value loss from selling assets below fundamental value for these firms is outweighed 
by a reduction in the expected costs of financial distress.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows that divestments by firms in the IND 1 group generate insignificant CARs of 
-0.03%. These results are lower than the 0.94% average CAR for non-distressed firms, and there is a 
significant difference between the two groups (at the 1% level). The magnitude of this difference is 
more pronounced when focusing on the IND 2 measure of distress. The average CAR is -0.66% and 
the difference in returns between distressed and non-distressed firms is -1.57% (both significant at 
the 10% level or better). The more pronounced difference between distressed and non-distressed 
firms in the IND 2 group supports Acharya et al. (2007), who show that their refined definition of 
industry-wide distress utilizing both stock price and accounting data is a stronger predictor of 
recovery values following defaults than industry-wide distress based on stock returns alone. These 
findings support hypothesis 2 and are consistent with fire sales by firms experiencing industry-wide 
distress. This does not rule out financing as a motivation for the divestment. Indeed, the fire sale 
explanation implies that divestments are forced as firms must raise cash in order to meet liabilities 
falling due. Our results suggest that the fire sale effect outweighs any financing benefits for firms 
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experiencing industry-wide distress and leads to a significantly lower stock price response to 
divestments. This can arise where the natural buyers of the asset are also financially constrained and 
could be selling off similar assets. Under these conditions, the divested assets are likely to be 
purchased by lower value users who are willing to acquire the assets only at a significant discount to 
their fundamental value (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011).  
We find that the average CAR for divestments during periods of economy-wide distress is 
1.08% (significant at the 1% level). As with the findings for firm-level distress, the results are not 
significantly higher than those for non-distressed periods. Our findings are therefore inconsistent 
with the competing hypotheses 3a and 3b on the relative importance of financing and fire sale 
effects during periods of economy-wide distress, and suggest that no specific effect dominates 
during these periods. Contrasting our findings with those for industry-wide distress, and given the 
correlation between industry-wide and economy-wide distress shown in Table 2, our results 
highlight that the impact of economy-wide distress on divestment activity is distinct from the fire 
sale conditions associated with industry-wide distress in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).  
We extend our univariate analysis in Table 5, which presents regression results of event study 
CARs against financial distress conditions and our control variables for divesting firm and deal 
characteristics outlined in Section 3. Our summary statistics in Table 3 highlight that firm and deal 
characteristics that are correlated with divestments during distress periods vary with the nature of 
the distress, highlighting the need to control for these factors in our regression analysis. Our 
univariate analysis could also overstate the significance of differences in t-statistics between 
distressed and non-distressed periods due to cross-correlation of firm observations during periods of 
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industry-wide and economy-wide distress. To correct for this, we follow Duchin and Schmidt (2013) 
and cluster standard errors for each Datastream level 6 industry group in our sample.13 
Model 1 in Table 5 examines the impact of firm distress on CARs and reports a positive, but 
insignificant and economically small, coefficient of 0.16%. This supports our univariate finding and 
suggests that firm-level financing benefits are unrelated to CARs surrounding divestments for 
distressed firms. Across all models we find that firm size is negatively related to CARs, but the 
remaining control variables are insignificant. We interpret this as suggesting that stockholders in 
small firms benefit to a greater extent from asset divestments because they are less easily able to 
mitigate financing constraints by raising funds from alternative sources. 
In the fire sale model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) the divesting firm has defaulted on its 
debt and is forced to sell assets in order to repay creditors. However, Kruse (2002) develops a more 
relaxed version of this theory. Firms can experience a performance shock, but as they remain a going 
concern they may not be forced to divest assets. The decision to divest will depend on firm 
characteristics as well as the severity of financial distress conditions. Borisova et al. (2013) make a 
similar point on selection bias in the context of the choice to divest to a domestic or foreign buyer.  
To address this concern we use a Heckman (1979) treatment effects model to estimate the 
probability of divesting assets at time t relative to financial distress conditions and firm 
characteristics at time t-1. We estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is set equal to 
one if the firm divests assets at time t, and zero otherwise. Data is collected for all UK publicly 
quoted firms with available financial data in Datastream and we match this to data on divestment 
announcements from SDC Platinum.14 We examine the decision to divest against all three financial 
                                                
13 Our results are unaffected if we correct for cross-correlation at the economy level and cluster standard errors by 
year. 
14 Our findings here potentially understate the degree of divestment activity by UK firms during our sample period. 
Oswald and Young (2004) note that SDC Platinum coverage is incomplete for repurchasing activity by UK firms during 
the earlier part of our sample period and it is possible the same may apply for our sample of asset divestments.  
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distress conditions and control variables from the models proposed by Harford (1999), Kruse 
(2002), and Pulvino (1998). We present these results in Appendix B. We then use these models to 
estimate the inverse Mills ratio, denoted as LAMBDA, as an additional control variable in second 
stage regression models of divestment announcement CARs. The inclusion of the required control 
variables to estimate LAMBDA reduces the sample size to 7,459 observations. We present two 
separate models in Appendix B, one for IND 1 and one for IND 2. In regressions where FIRM and 
ECON are the main explanatory variables we use LAMBDA calculated from Model 1, which uses 
IND 1 to estimate the probability of divestment.15  
Model 2 of Table 5 shows the results of the Heckman treatment model with FIRM as the 
main explanatory variable. The coefficient on FIRM distress is positive 0.40% and is weakly 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient for LAMBDA is positive but insignificant in this and all 
of the regression models in Table 5, suggesting that factors associated with the decision to divest 
have not significantly biased our initial estimates. Our findings in Model 2 provide some support for 
hypothesis 1 relating to the firm-level financing benefits of divesting assets for firms experiencing an 
idiosyncratic performance shock.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Models 3 to 6 examine the impact of IND 1 and IND 2 distress on CARs, with OLS 
regressions in the odd numbered columns and second-stage treatment regressions in the even 
numbered columns. Consistent with our univariate analysis, the coefficients for both our measures 
of industry-wide distress suggests that CARs are between 0.92% and 1.59% lower for divestments 
                                                
15 Our results are unchanged if we use LAMBDA estimated from regression Model 2 or if we estimate regressions of 
the probability to divest against financial distress conditions individually. 
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during these periods (all significant at the 5% level or better). This provides strong support for 
hypothesis 2. Once again, the results are economically larger for the IND 2 measure of distress that 
uses both stock price performance and sales growth to identify distress. Even if one attributes the 
entire effect of IND 1 to revised future growth prospects in a declining stock price, there is a 
residual effect of industry-wide distress in our IND 2 dummy (Acharya et al., 2007). Our descriptive 
statistics in Table 2 highlights the relative infrequency of divestments during industry-wide distress 
periods, suggesting that firms are aware of the potential for fire sale discounts on divested assets and 
respond by divesting less frequently. Our results show that the lower price received for divested 
assets during industry-wide distress conditions is reflected in a significantly lower stock price 
response to divestment announcements for these firms. 
Models 7 and 8 examine the impact of economy-wide distress on divestment CARs. As with 
firm-level distress, the coefficient for ECON is positive and significant only in the treatment Model 
8. This provides partial support for the financing benefits to asset divestments during periods of 
economy-wide distress and is consistent with hypothesis 3a, suggesting higher returns to divestments 
during periods of economy-wide distress. At the very least the results allow us to reject hypothesis 
3b that fire sale effects lead to a lower stock price response to divestments during periods of 
economy-wide distress. During periods of economy-wide distress, any value loss in selling assets 
from a weakened bargaining position is outweighed by a reduction in expected costs of financial 
distress. We propose that the source of financing benefits during economy-wide distress arises from 
the ability of financially constrained firms to sell assets to acquiring firms outside their operating 
industry that are financially healthy or at least not impacted by the economy-wide distress to the 
same extent as the divesting firm. We examine this issue in more detail in section 4.5. 
Collectively, our results in Tables 4 and 5 show that during industry-wide distress periods, 
when the natural buyers of the divested assets are also likely to experience financing constraints, the 
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fire sale effect results in a significantly lower stock price response to divestment announcements. 
Our findings for firm-level distress provide limited support on the financing benefits for asset 
divestments. We also provide new evidence on the potential financing benefits to asset divestments 
during periods of economy-wide distress, which is by comparison noticeably underexplored in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
4.3. Debt capacity, fire sales, and financing 
Thus far our examination of financial distress conditions treats all firms equally, irrespective 
of the financing constraints they face prior to the performance shock. However, both the financing 
and fire sale theories of asset divestments predict an important role for a firm’s debt capacity in 
predicting the likelihood of divestment (Kruse, 2002; Ofek, 1993) and the stock price response 
(Brown et al., 1994; Lasfer et al., 1996). Under the financing theory firms sell assets because they are 
the lowest cost source of funding for a firm that needs to raise capital quickly (Lang et al., 1995). 
The cost of raising finance is expected to be greatest for firms suffering a liquidity shortfall and 
long-term debt overhang problems. As such, we expect that the potential financing benefits to 
divestment will be concentrated in the sub-sample of firms with low debt capacity. Likewise, under 
the fire sale hypothesis stock price returns on announcement are discounted when forced 
divestments take place during a period of industry-wide distress. In the original Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) model firms are forced to sell assets, but in practice, industry-wide distress conditions are a 
determinant of the likelihood that divestment takes place (Pulvino, 1998). We expect that fire sale 
conditions and the resulting lower stock price response to divestments during periods of industry-
wide distress are concentrated in the sub-sample of divestments for firms with low debt capacity. 
To examine how debt capacity affects abnormal returns to selling firms around divestment 
announcements we add the CAPLO dummy variable to our OLS regression models in Table 5. 
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Table 6 shows the coefficient for CAPLO is positive but statistically insignificant in Models 1, 4, 7, 
and 10, which examine each of our individual financial distress conditions. Therefore, divestment 
announcement abnormal returns are not driven by resolution of financial distress costs for the full 
sample. This is not surprising as for the general population we would expect that divestments are 
driven by a variety of strategic motivations including refocusing on core operations (Berger and 
Ofek, 1999). The inclusion of CAPLO as an explanatory variable also does not affect the relation 
between financial distress conditions and CARs surrounding divestments announcements.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Following our earlier discussion, we expect that financing and fire sale effects of asset 
divestments are restricted to the sub-sample of firms that are forced to sell assets to resolve financial 
distress. We identify these firms based on the CAPLO dummy and we estimate separate regressions 
of abnormal returns against financial distress conditions for low debt capacity and all other firms.  
In Models 2 and 3 of Table 6 we present these results for firm-level distress. For low debt 
capacity firms in Model 2, we find that returns are 0.80% higher for sellers experiencing firm-level 
distress (significant at the 5% level). For unconstrained firms in Model 3, abnormal returns for 
sellers experiencing firm-level distress are indistinguishable from non-distressed firms. This provides 
support for hypothesis 1 and the firm-level financing benefits to asset divestments for financially 
constrained firms. Firm-level financial distress conditions do not in isolation lead to higher returns 
for distressed sellers, but for firms experiencing financial constraints due to a combination of poor 
short-term liquidity and long-term debt overhang, divesting assets is expected to reduce the present 
value of the costs of financial distress (Clayton and Reisel, 2013). 
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We examine the role of industry-wide distress in Models 5 and 6 (IND 1) and 8 and 9 (IND 
2) of Table 6, again partitioned by our CAPLO dummy. Our main result of a negative relation 
between industry-wide distress and abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements is 
again restricted to the sub-sample of low debt capacity firms in Models 5 and 8. Announcement 
period CARs for IND 1 and IND 2 are 1.71% and 2.76% lower respectively (both significant at the 
1% level) in comparison to non-distressed divesting firms. This can be explained by fire sale 
discounts when financially constrained firms are forced to sell assets, and provides strong support 
for hypothesis 2. Firms with low debt capacity that suffer short-term term liquidity constraints and 
long-term debt overhang are forced to sell assets at times when the natural buyers of these assets are 
also likely to be financially constrained, and as a result receive a lower price for the divested assets. 
Firms with spare debt capacity do not experience fire sale discounts during periods of industry-wide 
distress, as shown by the insignificant coefficients for IND 1 and IND 2 in Models 6 and 9 
respectively.  
In Models 11 and 12 we find no evidence that the relation between economy-wide distress 
and abnormal returns for selling firms surrounding asset sale announcements varies with selling firm 
debt capacity. Our results here fail to provide support for the relative importance of firm-level 
financing benefits for firms selling assets during periods of economy-wide distress, irrespective of 
whether the asset sale is likely to be have been forced by low debt capacity. At the very least our 
findings do again suggest an important distinction between industry- and economy-wide distress 
conditions in understanding fire sale discounts (Acharya et al., 2007). Fire sale discounts to asset 
sales are not present during periods of economy-wide distress for our sample of divestments. 
For our control variables, we find that firm size is negatively related to divestment returns in 
all regression models. For unconstrained firms we find a negative relation between MTB and 
abnormal returns (significant at the 10% level), which may be driven by free cash flow concerns 
30 
 
when unconstrained managers have discretion to reinvest the divestment proceeds (Lang et al., 
1995).16 
Overall, our findings for low debt capacity firms highlight an important channel through 
which financing and fire sale effects have a strong impact on announcement returns to corporate 
asset divestitures. To the extent that low debt capacity firms are more likely to have been forced to 
sell assets under pressure from creditors, the strong stock price impact under firm-level and 
industry-wide distress highlights that financing and fire sale effects are most important for financially 
constrained firms with low debt capacity. For unconstrained firms, strategic motivations are 
expected to be more important in explaining stock price returns surrounding the divestment 
announcement. 
 
4.4. Interaction of financial distress conditions 
Our previous findings in Tables 4 and 5 focus on individual distress conditions but do not 
consider the overlapping firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide distress conditions 
highlighted in Table 2. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) fire sale model emphasizes the importance of 
industry-wide or economy-wide distress conditions over firm-level distress in creating fire sale 
conditions. If the performance shock that necessitates an asset sale is idiosyncratic to the firm, then 
potential buyers do not suffer the liquidity and debt overhang problems that prevent buyers from 
bidding the price of the asset up to its fundamental value in best use. By isolating various 
combinations of distress conditions we are better able to examine the impact of specific distress 
conditions on the market response to divestment announcements.  
                                                
16 We exclude LAMBDA here and in subsequent tables since the variable is not significantly related to abnormal 
returns in Table 5. We perform additional untabulated regressions with LAMBDA as an additional control variable. We 
again find that higher returns to distressed to firm-level and industry-wide distress are restricted to the sub-sample of low 
debt capacity sellers. The inclusion of LAMBDA leads to the ECON variable becoming positive and significantly in 
Model 11 for the sub-sample of low debt capacity firms. As with Table 5, we find that LAMBDA is insignificant in all 
regressions, suggesting that selection bias has not significantly impacted on the results presented here.  
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Empirical research on the overlap of financial distress conditions suggests that industry-wide 
distress and resulting fire sale conditions outweigh any firm-level financing benefits to divestments. 
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that industry conditions are more important than firm specific 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in explaining the asset sale and plant closure decisions of bankrupt firms. 
Also Kruse (2002) finds that divestment activity is more likely for healthy firms in growing 
industries. Overlapping financial distress conditions can also affect the price received for the asset, 
and therefore the stock price response to a divestment announcement. Pulvino (1998) finds that 
aircraft sales by financially constrained firms occur at a discounted price only when the airline 
industry is distressed. Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) find evidence of fire sale discounts in automatic 
bankruptcy auctions when the industry is suffering financial distress. Using the same z-score 
measure to identify firm-level financial distress as Afshar et al. (1992) and Lasfer et al. (1996), 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) find a higher stock price response to divestments by non-
distressed firms, which is strongest during economy-wide distress conditions.17 In contrast, Ang and 
Mauck (2011) find that merger premiums to financially distressed firms are higher during economy-
wide distress periods.  
Given the financing benefit to divestments under firm-level and economy-wide distress 
conditions shown in Tables 5 and 6, our previous findings for industry-wide distress could 
understate the severity of the negative market reaction to divestments under fire sale conditions. As 
such, we now extend our focus on financial distress to consider divestments in periods that overlap 
with firm-level, industry-wide and economy-wide distress conditions.  
                                                
17 Afshar et al. (1992) and Lasfer (1996) examine divestments made by UK firms in 1985 and 1986 whereas 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) examine divestments over the period 1987 to 1993, which incorporates an 
economy-wide UK recession in the early 1990s. As such, direct comparison of the differing findings of these studies is 
difficult, but it is clear that sample time period and time-varying economy-wide prospects are likely to be a factor in the 
differing results. 
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In Table 7 we present event study abnormal returns for each of the eight sub-samples of 
overlapping financial distress conditions outlined in Panel B of Table 2. Panel A presents results 
based on the IND 1 classification and Panel B presents our findings using the IND 2 classification 
of industry-wide distress.  
In both panels we find abnormal returns of 0.93% (significant at the 1% level) for firms 
selling assets in the absence of financial distress conditions. We find support for the financing 
benefits of divestments during periods of combined firm-level and economy-wide distress. 
Abnormal returns are 1.99% and 1.57% respectively (both significant at the 1% level) and the 
difference relative to the non-distressed group is weakly significant at the 10% level in Panel A. We 
find no evidence that firm-level or economy-wide distress in isolation is associated with significant 
differences in CARs between distressed and no distress announcements, suggesting that our earlier 
results of a financing benefit under both circumstances is restricted to the sub-sample of divesting 
firms experiencing firm-level and economy-wide distress simultaneously. This can arise where firm-
level distress generates a need to sell assets and under economy-wide distress conditions there are 
sufficient non-distressed acquirers from outside of the operating industry to provide an important 
source of competitive bidding to counteract the liquidity discounts observed during periods of 
industry-wide distress (Borisova et al., 2013). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
We again find evidence consistent with fire sale conditions during periods of industry-wide 
distress, both in isolation and when interacted with a period of economy-wide distress. In most cases 
the returns are insignificantly negative, but the difference between returns for divestments during 
industry-wide distress periods and no distress periods are significant and negative (at the 5% level or 
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better). For example, during periods of industry-wide distress in isolation (combined with economy-
wide distress) the returns are 1.50% (1.24%) lower in comparison to divestments by healthy firms, 
when focusing on the IND 1 measure of distress. Our findings are even stronger for IND 2 distress 
conditions.  
We extend this univariate analysis in Table 8, which presents the results of regressions of 
CARs surrounding divestment announcements against overlapping financial distress conditions. We 
present results for the full sample and separately for financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
based on our CAPLO dummy, given the importance assigned to this variable in Section 4.3. To 
define overlapping financial distress conditions we use only the included dummy variables for each 
distress condition.18 Models 1 to 3 in Panel A examine IND 1 distress conditions and Models 4 to 6 
in Panel B examine IND 2 distress. The reported coefficient compares abnormal returns for the 
included distress conditions group relative to the omitted no distress conditions group.  
Our regressions for the full sample confirm that industry-wide distress is the most consistent 
determinant of divestment returns in our sample. The coefficients for industry-wide distress in 
isolation (Models 1 and 4) are significantly negative. The differences of 2.12% in Model 1 and 2.86% 
in Model 4 are economically large both in absolute terms and in comparison to the corresponding 
figures of 0.92% and 1.59% in Table 5. These results highlight that the severity of fire sale discounts 
is potentially understated when the relevant research study fails to filter out the potential financing 
benefits to asset divestments during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide distress.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
                                                
18 For example, the notation FIRM + IND + ECON indicates that the divestment announcement took place under 
firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide financial distress conditions simultaneously. The notation IND indicates 
that the divestment took place during industry-wide distress conditions, but the overall economy and the announcing 
firm were not distressed at the time of the announcement.  
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In contrast to our earlier findings in Table 5, we find no evidence of higher returns for 
divestments by firms experiencing economy-wide or firm-level distress in isolation, but inclusion of 
firm distress can mitigate the negative impact of industry-wide distress conditions on announcement 
abnormal returns. We also find that firm size is negatively related to divestment abnormal returns in 
all of our models and our remaining control variables are insignificant.  
For the sub-sample of low debt capacity divesting firms in Models 2 and 5, we confirm the 
negative relation between industry-wide distress and abnormal returns. We find that abnormal 
returns are significantly lower during periods of industry-wide distress for unconstrained firms, but 
the difference is economically smaller than observed for low debt capacity sellers. For the IND 1 
classification we also find support for the univariate result of lower returns during periods of 
overlapping industry-wide and economy-wide distress within the sub-sample of financially 
constrained divesting firms, but the result is insignificant for the IND 2 measure of distress. 
For low debt capacity firms, we find evidence of a significant financing benefit to 
divestments during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide distress. The returns are 
3.25% (3.20%) higher based on our IND 1 (IND 2) classification. Our results suggest that any 
financing benefit from divestments during firm-level and economy-wide distress in the previous 
section is due to the overlap of financial distress conditions, and are conditional on financing 
constrains due to short-term liquidity and long-term debt overhang problems.  
Collectively, these findings highlight a core contribution in our paper. The results of prior 
studies that consider individual distress conditions in isolation are likely to include divestment 
announcements characterized by more than one type of distress condition, and therefore, may under 
or overstate the relevant financing and fire sale effects of financial distress conditions. Our findings 
in this section confirm the importance of industry-wide distress and resulting fire sale conditions in 
understanding the stock price response to divestment announcements. The financing benefit of 
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divestments within our sample is restricted to the sub-sample of low debt capacity firms 
experiencing both firm-level and economy-wide distress at the time of the divestment. If a recession 
increases the difficulty of obtaining external debt and equity funding for financially distressed firms, 
then asset divestments are more likely to represent the lowest cost source of financing for selling 
firms. 
 
4.5. Further determinants of financing benefits and fire sale costs to divestment announcements 
In this section we provide additional tests to further investigate the underlying determinants 
and drivers of the financing benefits and fire sale costs surrounding asset divestments by firms 
experiencing financial distress conditions. 
 
4.5.1. Firm size  
Following Kruse (2002) and Schlingemann et al. (2002) we have constructed our sample to 
exclude divestments by very small firms, in our case by focusing on firms included in the FTSE All-
Share Index of the LSE. This reduces concerns surrounding completeness of data coverage in SDC 
Platinum and the use of firm-level accounting data as a predictor of financial distress for smaller 
firms listed on secondary markets. However, by focusing on FTSE All-Share constituents we impose 
two potential selection biases. First, financial distress conditions are expected to be less severe for 
the largest firms in our sample, who can more easily raise debt and equity capital as an alternative to 
divesting assets. This effect would lead to the financing benefits and fire sale costs of asset 
divestments being concentrated amongst the smallest firms in our sample and biases against our 
ability to detect a relation between financial distress conditions and divestment CARs. Alternatively, 
asset sales by larger firms within an industry could be subject to greater fire sale discounts if smaller 
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industry competitors are unable to absorb larger asset sales. This would lead to fire sale effects being 
concentrated amongst the largest firms in our sample.  
To examine this issue we report separate regressions in Table 9 for large and small sample 
firms, where large firms are identified as those with book value of total assets above the overall 
sample median. In Models 1 and 2 we find no relation between firm-level distress and abnormal 
returns by both large and small sample firms. CARs are negatively related to firm size and growth 
opportunities for the sub-sample of large firms only. None of our control variables are related to the 
CARs for small firms and the explanatory power of our regressions for the sub-sample of small 
firms is generally low (the R-squared values are approximately half those of large firms and the 
regression F-statistics are insignificant for this group of divestments). 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
In Models 3 to 6 we examine the role of industry-wide financial distress conditions. We find 
that the negative relation documented earlier in the paper is driven by the sub-sample of smaller 
firms in Models 4 and 6. Industry-wide distress is unrelated to abnormal returns surrounding 
divestment announcements for the largest firms in our sample. Finally, in Models 7 and 8 we 
examine economy-wide distress and find that the financing benefit to divestments is restricted to the 
sub-sample of small firms in Model 8.  
Our finding that fire sale costs during industry-wide distress and financing benefits during 
economy-wide distress is restricted to the smallest firms in our sample most likely reflects larger 
firms having easier access to external debt and equity markets even during times of financial distress 
conditions, reducing their need to sell assets at distressed prices when these assets are most illiquid. 
It also highlights that our focus on large firms most likely means that our empirical findings 
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understate the true impact of financial distress on CARs surrounding asset divestments since the 
large firms in our sample have relatively easier access to alternative financing sources. 
 
4.5.2. Divestment of core and non-core assets  
We have previously identified industry-wide distress based on the overall divesting firm. 
However, the fire sale hypothesis primarily predicts that liquidity discounts and lower stock price 
returns on announcement are concentrated in divestments of core business assets. If divesting core 
assets leads to fire sale discounts, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992), then we expect to observe lower 
abnormal returns to divestment of core assets during periods of industry-wide distress. As long as 
industry-wide distress is less than perfectly positively correlated across all industries in the economy, 
fire sale discounts should not be evident for divestitures of non-core assets. The financing 
hypothesis, on the other hand, makes no clear distinction between core and non-core assets. The 
divested asset simply represents the lowest cost source of financing for the selling firm.  
We examine this issue in more depth by separating divestments between those involving the 
sale of core and non-core assets. In our main testing we find no relation between related divestments 
and stock price response to divestments. However, in the fire sale hypothesis it is specifically 
divestment of core assets, those subject to industry-wide distress conditions, which attract liquidity 
discounts. Moreover, under the financing explanation of the stock price response to economy-wide 
distress it is the ability of financially constrained firms to divest to non-industry competitors that 
drives the positive market reaction. This arises given the imperfect correlation of distress conditions 
across industries within the economy. We therefore estimate separate regressions of abnormal 
returns for divestment of core and non-core assets based on the RELATE variable described 
previously and we report our findings in Table 10.  
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In Models 1 and 2 we find no relation between firm-level distress and abnormal returns for 
firms selling core and non-core assets respectively, suggesting that benefits from re-focusing on core 
operations are unrelated to seller returns following a firm-level performance shock 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
We examine industry-wide distress in Models 3 to 6. In Models 3 and 5 we find significantly 
lower abnormal returns of 1.20% and 2.55% respectively (both significant at the 5% level) when 
firms sell off core assets that are most likely to suffer from fire sale discounts. The coefficients for 
IND 1 and IND 2 are noticeably weaker for disposal of non-core assets in Models 4 and 6 
respectively and  weakly (not) significant in Model 4 (6) (at the 10% level). Our results here highlight 
that it is specifically those assets expected to suffer from fire sale conditions that lead to 
stockholders discounting CARs to divestment announcements.  
In Models 7 and 8 we examine how the role of economy-wide distress varies for core and 
non-core assets. We find no relation in Models 7 and 8 respectively. This again provides support 
against hypothesis 3b that periods of economy-wide distress should be associated with fire sale 
discounts on the sale of business assets, and confirms that industry-wide and economy-wide distress 
conditions have different implications for the price that divesting firms can achieve when selling 
assets.  
Collectively, the results in Table 10 highlight an important aspect of fire sale costs from asset 
divestments. Fire sale conditions are most prevalent when firms experiencing industry-wide distress 
sell core operations since these are the assets that are most likely to be subject to liquidity discounts. 
Any discounts are expected to be small and insignificant when firms are able to dispose of non-core 
lines of business in healthy industries with an active market for corporate assets. 
39 
 
We now extend this analysis to examine relatedness between the selling firm/unit and the 
acquiring firm/unit. We identify related transactions where the acquiring firm/unit shares the same 
2-digit SIC code as the selling firm/unit. SIC codes for acquiring firms are again collected from SDC 
Platinum. When divesting firms sell assets to same-industry buyers we expect liquidity discounts to 
be most prevalent during periods of industry-wide distress and this can explain a lower stock price 
response to divestment announcements during these periods. If assets are sold to non-industry 
buyers during periods of economy-wide distress this provides evidence of potential financing 
benefits from selling assets to financially stronger buyers that are not subject the financial distress 
conditions affecting the divesting firm (Borisova et al., 2013). This allows us to provide direct 
evidence on the competing financing and fire sale hypotheses by examining who is acquiring the 
divested assets. We report these findings in Table 11. 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
Beginning with firm-level financial distress, we find no relation between distress conditions 
and the relatedness of the acquiring and divesting firm. This supports the basic proposition that the 
divested asset is the lowest cost source of financing during a period of firm-level financial distress. 
In the absence of liquidity constraints across industries and the economy there should be no direct 
relation between firm-level financial distress and the identity of the acquiring firm. 
During periods of industry distress we find no relation in Panels A and B between the 
operating industry of the divested unit and the acquiring firm/unit. However, we do find in Panels C 
and D that divesting parent firms are more likely to sell assets to acquiring firms/units in the same 
industry during periods of industry-wide distress (IND 1 in panel C and IND 1 and 2 in panel D). If 
same-industry acquiring firms are subject to the same industry-level financial distress conditions we 
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expect there are fewer buyers for the divested assets and divested assets are more likely to be subject 
to the resulting fire sale discounts. 
Panels A and B also point to strong potential source of financing benefits during periods of 
economy-wide distress. The divested unit is significantly less likely to share the 2-digit SIC code of 
the acquiring firm/unit during periods of economy-wide distress in comparison to non-distressed 
periods. We interpret this finding as showing that during periods of economy-wide distress, assets 
can be sold-off to non-industry acquirers that are unlikely to be subject to the financing constraints 
facing the divesting firm. This supports the general framework outlined in Borisova et al. (2013) to 
explain the role of outside, in their case foreign, acquiring firms as liquidity providers in the market 
for divested assets. 
We extend this analysis in Table 12 to directly examine the impact of relatedness between the 
divesting firm/unit and the acquiring parent firm in explaining the stock price response to asset 
divestments. We focus here on the relatedness between the divested assets and the acquiring parent 
firm.19 Panel A reports our findings for the full sample. We find weak evidence in Model 1 that 
announcement period returns are higher surrounding divestments where the acquiring parent and 
divested unit share the same 2-digit SIC code. This supports the fit/focus hypothesis developed in 
John and Ofek (1995). 
 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
Table 12 shows that the significance of our results surrounding industry-wide financial 
distress are restricted to divestments where the selling unit/parent operates in a different 2-digit SIC 
industry to the acquiring parent (Models 4 and 6). We interpret this result as supportive of the fire 
                                                
19 Our results are generally unchanged when we examine other combinations of relatedness between the divesting 
firm/unit and the acquiring firm/unit 
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sale theory. When divesting firms are forced to sell assets to non-industry firms, these acquiring 
firms attach a lower value to the asset and are willing to pay a lower price for the purchased asset 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Stockholders in the divesting firm recognize this at the time of the 
divestment announcement and react less positively to the announcement. This provides direct 
support for our explanation of the source of fire sale costs during industry-wide distress. Abnormal 
returns are lower when firms sell core assets and when assets are sold to non-industry buyers during 
industry-wide distress conditions. 
Turning now to economy-wide distress, we find weak evidence in Model 8 that divestments 
to non-industry acquiring firms drive the positive stock price response to asset divestment 
announcements. This supports our previous explanation that financing benefits to divestments 
during periods of economy-wide distress can be derived from selling assets to deep pocketed 
acquiring firms. So long as the economy-wide shock is less than perfectly positively correlated across 
firms and industries there can be a sufficient number of non-distressed acquiring firms who can 
acquire the divested assets and reduce the liquidity discount associated with fire sale conditions 
during periods of industry-wide distress. 
We extend this analysis in Panel B of Table 12 where we consider the sub-sample of small 
divesting firms previously identified in Table 9 as being an important source of gains during periods 
of economy-wide distress. Focusing on small firms sharpens our findings. The coefficient on our 
ECON dummy variables highlights announcement period abnormal returns that are 2.19% higher 
during periods of economy-wide distress within the sub-sample of small firms. We find no 
consistent evidence that financing benefits to firm-level and fire sale costs during periods of 
industry-wide distress are stronger for small firms in Models 1 to 6 of Panel B. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 11 and 12 support our explanation of the financing 
benefits to asset divestments during periods of economy-wide distress. The divested unit is more 
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likely to be sold to a non-industry acquiring unit or parent. As long as economy-wide distress is less 
than perfectly correlated across industries then acquiring firms are less likely to be financially 
constrained and can bid up the price of the divested assets to reduce or eliminate the liquidity 
discounts associated with fire sale conditions. These findings are most pronounced within the sub-
sample of small firms that we identify as most likely to be financially constrained and for whom the 
financing benefits to the divestment are expected to be largest. 
 
4.5.3. Deal size  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 highlight that deal size (DSIZE) is higher for 
divestments during periods of industry-wide distress, and is unrelated to firm-level and economy-
wide distress conditions. Thus far, we have omitted a control for relative deal size from our 
regressions given its limited reporting in SDC Platinum. However, Lang et al. (1995) and Lasfer et al. 
(1996) find that CARs surrounding divestments increase with deal size. Therefore, we re-estimate 
our main regressions with additional controls for DSIZE and an interaction term between DSIZE 
and our four financial distress conditions. We propose that deal size can magnify the positive 
financing and negative fire sale effects of divestments. Following Lang et al. (1995), we expect a 
positive relation between deal size and CARs during non-distress periods.  
We present these results in Table 13 and find that DSIZE is positively related to CARs in all 
models. The positive coefficient for DSIZE is consistent Lang et al. (1995), where gains to asset 
divestments are increasing with the relative size of the divested asset.  
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
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Inclusion of the interaction term between deal size and financial distress causes our industry-
wide distress variables to lose their statistical significance, but the interaction of DSIZE and 
industry-wide distress (IND 1) is significant and negative in Model 2.20 This highlights that, 
conditional on industry-wide distress conditions and the resulting fire sale costs, larger divestments 
are associated with larger fire sale discounts.21 We find no significant interaction effect between 
economy-wide distress and deal size surrounding divestment announcements and economy-wide 
distress is positively related to abnormal returns. Firm size remains negatively related to abnormal 
returns in all regression models.  
Our findings in Tables 3 and 13 highlight an important additional aspect to fire sale 
discounts for divesting firms during periods of industry-wide distress. Our findings here show that 
deal size magnifies fire sale costs for divesting firms during periods of industry-wide distress. 
Divestments during industry-wide distress periods involve the sale of relatively larger assets at 
precisely the time when the market for those assets is expected to be least liquid because the natural 
buyers of these assets experience their own financing constraints.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we investigate how the stock price response to asset divestment announcements 
varies with financial distress conditions at the level of the individual firm, the operating industry, and 
economy-wide. We analyze a large sample of divestments by UK firms between 1988 and 2009 that 
covers significant variation in firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide distress conditions.  
                                                
20 It is specifically the inclusion of the interaction variables between deal size and distress that leads to our industry-
wide distress measures losing significance. When we re-estimate our regression models from Table 5 with only the 
additional control for deal size, industry-wide distress remains negative and significantly related to abnormal returns at 
the 5% level or better. 
21 This result is again driven by the sub-sample of low debt capacity divesting firms. 
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We contribute to the literature on asset divestments by isolating the impact of specific and 
overlapping distress conditions on how markets respond to these announcements and by examining 
how firm and deal characteristics interact with these factors. This approach allows us to examine fire 
sale explanations, as distinct from financing explanations of divestment announcements. Conflicting 
results on the importance of these factors in explaining the market reaction across sample time 
periods and definitions of financial distress motivate our investigation. 
Our results consistently find that the market reaction to divestment announcements during 
periods of industry-wide distress is significantly lower than for non-distressed firms, which supports 
the fire sale explanation of asset sales. During periods of industry-wide distress the natural buyers of 
the divested asset are likely to also be distressed, which increases the likelihood of asset purchases by 
low-value users who are expected to pay a lower price for the divested asset.  
Our analysis of overlapping distress conditions highlights the importance of identifying 
distinct periods of financial distress when examining corporate restructuring transactions. We do not 
find a relation between firm-level and economy-wide distress in isolation and CARs surrounding 
divestment announcements. We show that fire sale costs surrounding industry-wide distress, and in 
the absence of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide distress, are economically larger than 
understood in prior studies that fails to isolate the impact of distinct financial distress conditions. 
When firms divest assets during periods of industry-wide and firm-level distress, the stock price 
response to asset divestments is insignificant, which suggests that financing and fire sale effects 
offset.  
We find support for the financing hypothesis whereby the stock price response to 
divestment announcements is higher during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide 
distress. This arises when firms divesting assets to alleviate financial distress at the firm-level benefit 
from selling assets to non-distressed acquiring firms who can provide liquidity in the market for 
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divested assets given imperfect correlation of distress conditions across industries (Borisova et al. 
2013).  
We also find that the effect of distress conditions on CARs to divestment announcements is 
restricted to specific firm and deal characteristics including low debt capacity, the sale of core assets, 
and small firms. Fire sale discounts during industry-wide distress are driven by divestment of the 
core assets subject to industry-wide distress, small divesting firms, and divestments by financially 
constrained firms that are likely to be forced to sell assets under pressure from creditors. Financing 
benefits during periods of economy-wide distress are restricted to assets purchased by non-industry 
acquiring firms made by small, and potentially financially constrained, divesting firms. 
Analyzing the role of financial distress conditions in the determinants of asset divestments 
relative to other types of corporate restructuring is a potentially fruitful area for future research. 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that the liquidity of the market for divested assets is a major 
determinant of asset divestments. We expect that firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide 
distress conditions can impact the liquidity of the market for corporate assets. This can also lead 
firms to engage in other non-cash generating corporate restructuring activities, such as employee 
layoffs and accounting write downs of firm assets (see Marshall et al., 2012). Examining the buyers 
of divested assets would also be an interesting extension of this study. On the one hand, divesting 
assets at discounted prices during periods of industry-wide distress can allow for a buyers’ market 
and generate abnormal returns for acquiring firms. On the other, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose 
that under fire sale conditions industry-specific assets are more likely to be sold to low-value and 
non-industry users, for whom a discounted price from the seller’s perspective represents a fair price. 
Examining the role of financial distress conditions, buyer identity, and asset type in divestment 
decisions from the buyer and sellers’ perspective is worthy of further study. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions 
Variable Variable 
reference 
Description 
Panel A: Distress conditions  
Firm-level distress FIRM A dummy variable set equal to one if the divestment is made by a firm 
reporting negative net income before extraordinary items and preferred 
dividends in the financial year prior to the divestment announcement, and 
zero otherwise.  
Industry-wide 
distress 
IND 1 A dummy variable set equal to one if the divestment takes places during a 
calendar year where the median stock price return of all firms in the 
Datastream level 6 industry group is less than -30%, and zero otherwise.  
 IND 2 A dummy variable set equal to one if IND 1 equals one and the median 
revenue growth for all firms in the Datastream level 6 industry group is 
negative during the calendar year of the divestment, and zero otherwise.  
Economy-wide 
distress 
ECON A dummy variable set equal to one if the divestment takes places during a 
recessionary quarter, and zero otherwise. A recession is defined using the UK 
Government’s Treasury definition of two or more consecutive quarters of 
declining real GDP.  
   
Panel B: Control variables 
Firm size FSIZE Book value of total assets in £000s inflated to 2009 at consumer price 
inflation. 
Deal size DSIZE Price received for divested asset divided by book value of total assets at the 
financial year-end prior to the divestment announcement. 
Growth 
opportunities 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
Related divestment RELATE A dummy variable set equal to one if the divested asset is in the same two-
digit SIC industry code as the parent firm, and zero otherwise. 
Repeat divestment CLUSTER A dummy variable set equal to one if the divesting firm had announced 
another divestment in the 180 days prior to the divestment announcement, 
and zero otherwise.  
Low debt capacity CAPLO A dummy variable set equal to one if the divesting firm had a leverage ratio 
above the industry median and a current ratio below the industry median, and 
zero otherwise. Industry medians are derived from Datastream level 6 industry 
groups. Leverage is defined as book value of total debt divided by book value 
of total assets. The current ratio is defined as current assets divided by current 
liabilities. 
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Table 2 
Divestment frequency and financial distress conditions  
Panel A: Divestment frequency and financial distress conditions over time 
Year Divestment frequency FIRM IND 1 IND 2 ECON 
1988 323 49 1 0 0 
1989 477 116 0 0 0 
1990 491 145 89 10 256 
1991 515 136 5 0 389 
1992 489 93 29 8 0 
1993 507 69 0 0 0 
1994 491 80 0 0 0 
1995 524 91 0 0 0 
1996 564 82 0 0 0 
1997 646 87 0 0 0 
1998 672 127 33 12 0 
1999 671 153 0 0 0 
2000 704 214 49 43 0 
2001 606 225 177 76 0 
2002 461 157 130 106 0 
2003 499 127 0 0 0 
2004 371 62 1 0 0 
2005 324 58 0 0 0 
2006 341 71 14 14 0 
2007 388 87 6 3 0 
2008 343 141 314 74 274 
2009 311 82 0 0 158 
Total 10,718 2,452 848 346 1,077 
      
Panel B: Divestment frequency for firms experiencing overlapping distress conditions 
 Divestment frequency 
 IND 1 IND 2 
Firm, industry-wide and economy-wide distress 122 23 
Firm and industry-wide distress 185 97 
Firm and economy-wide distress 217 316 
Firm distress only 1,928 2,016 
Industry-wide and economy-wide distress 189 38 
Industry-wide distress only 352 188 
Economy-wide distress only 549 700 
No distress conditions 7,176 7,340 
Total 10,718 10,718 
The table presents summary statistics for a sample of divestment announcements by UK firms from 1988 to 2009. The 
sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE All-Share Index of the London Stock Exchange. 
Measures of financial distress are defined in Table 1. The exclusion of a distress category in Panel B denotes that the 
divestment took place during non-distress conditions in that category.  
 
  
51 
 
Table 3 
Firm and deal characteristics for distressed and non-distressed divestment announcements 
Variable Distressed Mean [Median] 
Non-distressed 
Mean [Median] 
T-test of means [Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test of medians] 
Panel A: FIRM    
Number of announcements 2,452 8,266  
FSIZE 8,801 [1,054] 
6,903 
[880] 
3.80*** 
[1.88]* 
DSIZE 0.100 [0.020] 
0.097 
[0.021] 
0.28 
[-1.32] 
MTB 2.728 [1.546] 
2.861 
[1.698] 
-0.64 
[-4.93]*** 
RELATE 0.405 0.396 0.812 
CLUSTER 0.574 0.565 0.745 
CAPLO 0.418 0.407 0.885 
Panel B: IND 1    
Number of announcements 848 9,870  
FSIZE 9,660 [511] 
9,146 
[938] 
3.15*** 
[-5.30]*** 
DSIZE 0.176 [0.033] 
0.092 
[0.020] 
6.66*** 
[4.52]*** 
MTB 4.846 [1.707] 
2.668 
[1.656] 
6.65*** 
[0.44] 
RELATE 0.466 0.392 4.21*** 
CLUSTER 0.485 0.574 -4.99*** 
CAPLO 0.385 0.411 -1.46 
Panel C: IND 2    
Number of announcements 346 10,372  
FSIZE 15,100 [425] 
7,081 
[930] 
6.69*** 
[-4.03]*** 
DSIZE 0.183 [0.037] 
0.095 
[0.021] 
4.64*** 
[3.53]*** 
MTB 5.840 [1.703] 
2.731 
[1.662] 
6.34*** 
[0.14] 
RELATE 0.405 0.398 0.26 
CLUSTER 0.535 0.568 -1.24 
CAPLO 0.408 0.409 -0.04 
Panel D: ECON    
Number of announcements 1,077 9,641  
FSIZE 7,201 [1,105] 
7,348 
[887] 
-0.21 
[0.34] 
DSIZE 0.107 [0.020] 
0.097 
[0.021] 
0.78 
[-0.34] 
MTB 2.251 [1.531] 
2.896 
[1.694] 
-2.25** 
[-3.01]*** 
RELATE 0.469 0.390 5.023*** 
CLUSTER 0.561 0.568 -0.451 
CAPLO 0.498 0.400 5.44*** 
The table presents summary statistics and differences in means and medians across distressed and non-distressed firms 
for our sample of divestment announcements. Medians are reported in brackets below means. The significance of the 
difference in sample means is determined using a two-sample t-test. The significance of the differences in medians is 
determined in using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. All variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress conditions 
Financial distress measure FIRM IND 1 IND 2 ECON 
Distressed 
1.05% 
(9.64)*** 
[2,452] 
-0.03% 
(-0.06) 
[848] 
-0.66% 
(-1.66)* 
[346] 
1.08% 
(4.60)*** 
[1,077] 
Non-distressed 
0.74% 
(12.68)*** 
[8,266] 
0.94% 
(11.54)*** 
[9,870] 
0.91% 
(15.82)*** 
[10,372] 
0.84% 
(15.19)*** 
[9,641] 
Difference 0.31% (1.00) 
-0.96% 
(-3.19)*** 
-1.57% 
(-2.40)** 
0.24% 
(0.69) 
The table reports average thee-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment announcements 
categorized by individual financial distress conditions. CARs are measured over the three-day event window beginning 
one day prior to the announcement date, day zero. Measures of financial distress are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and the number of observations is shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 5 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS Treatment OLS Treatment OLS Treatment OLS Treatment 
FIRM 0.0016 (0.75) 
0.0040 
(1.76)*       
IND 1   -0.0092 (-2.66)** 
-0.0101 
(-2.78)***     
IND 2     -0.0159 (-2.43)** 
-0.0135 
(-2.64)**   
ECON       0.0048 (1.44) 
0.0070 
(1.72)* 
         
LAMBDA  0.0134 (1.42)  
0.0137 
(1.42)  
0.0147 
(1.55)  
0.0135 
(1.46) 
LN (FSIZE) -0.0023 (-3.54)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.61)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.59)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.59)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.55)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.57)*** 
MTB -0.0001 (-0.33) 
-0.0002 
(-1.57) 
-0.0001 
(-0.29) 
-0.0002 
(-1.43) 
-0.0001 
(-0.28) 
-0.0002 
(-1.51) 
-0.0001 
(-0.32) 
-0.0002 
(-1.56) 
RELATE 0.0004 (0.26) 
-0.0013 
(-0.72) 
0.0007 
(0.40) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
0.0005 
(0.30) 
-0.0012 
(-0.71) 
0.0003 
(0.18) 
-0.0014 
(-0.78) 
CLUSTER 0.0012 (0.58) 
0.0018 
(0.74) 
0.0010 
(0.51) 
0.0016 
(0.68) 
0.0012 
(0.60) 
0.0018 
(0.75) 
0.0012 
(0.58) 
0.0018 
(0.77) 
Intercept 0.0390 (4.62)*** 
0.0192 
(1.20) 
0.0405 
(4.70)*** 
0.0206 
(1.23) 
0.0404 
(4.72)*** 
0.0185 
(1.14) 
0.0389 
(4.54)*** 
0.0191 
(1.22) 
Number of 
observations 9,713 7,459 9,713 7,459 9,713 7,459 9,713 7,459 
Adjusted-R2  0.005 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 
F-statistic 4.86*** 4.46*** 5.13*** 4.64*** 5.72*** 4.04*** 5.43*** 4.87*** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. Heckman treatment regressions are estimated using a two-step procedure. LAMBDA is the inverse 
Mills ratio derived from probit regressions of the propensity to divest assets in Appendix B. T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 6 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress conditioned by debt capacity of divesting 
firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
FIRM 0.0035 (1.55) 
0.0080 
(2.33)*** 
0.0001 
(0.07)      
    
IND 1    -0.0118 (-2.78)*** 
-0.0171 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.0078 
(-1.41)   
    
IND 2       -0.0195 (-2.63)** 
-0.0276 
(-3.36)*** 
-0.0018 
(-1.01) 
   
ECON          0.0067 (1.56) 
0.0100 
(1.50) 
0.0028 
(0.54) 
             
CAPLO 0.0021 (0.89)   
0.0021 
(0.90)   
0.0022 
(0.96)  
 0.0019 
(0.82) 
  
LN (FSIZE) -0.0026 (-3.68)*** 
-0.0034 
(-2.48)** 
-0.0020 
(-2.60)** 
-0.0026 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.0034 
(-2.45)** 
-0.0020 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.0026 
(-3.85)*** 
-0.0035 
(-2.52)** 
-0.0021 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0026 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.0034 
(-2.46)** 
-0.0020 
(-2.60)** 
MTB 0.0000 (0.07) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
-0.0004 
(-1.90)* 
0.0001 
(0.13) 
0.0010 
(0.97) 
-0.0004 
(-1.92)* 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
0.0010 
(0.95) 
-0.0004 
(-1.94)* 
0.0000 
(0.07) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
-0.0004 
(-1.88)* 
RELATE -0.0013 (-0.73) 
-0.0026 
(-0.95) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
-0.0011 
(-0.61) 
-0.0025 
(-0.93) 
0.0003 
(0.12) 
-0.0013 
(-0.75) 
-0.0030 
(-1.07) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
-0.0014 
(-0.78) 
-0.0028 
(-1.05) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
CLUSTER 0.0012 (0.55) 
0.0050 
(1.16) 
-0.0009 
(-0.33) 
0.0010 
(0.47) 
0.0044 
(1.07) 
-0.0010 
(-0.36) 
0.0013 
(0.58) 
0.0048 
(1.16) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
0.0013 
(0.59) 
0.0048 
(1.17) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
Intercept 0.0425 (4.66)*** 
0.0507 
(2.88)*** 
0.0374 
(3.55)*** 
0.0447 
(4.87)*** 
0.0538 
(2.97)*** 
0.0386 
(3.77)*** 
0.0443 
(4.89)*** 
0.0539 
(3.04)*** 
0.0381 
(3.80)*** 
0.0425 
(4.60)*** 
0.0513 
(2.88)*** 
0.0371 
(3.54)*** 
Number of 
observations 7,996 3,235 4,761 7,996 3,235 4,761 7,996 3,235 4,761 7,996 3,235 4,761 
Adjusted-R2  0.006 0.016 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.007 
F-statistic 3.84*** 2.64** 3.10** 4.19*** 2.65** 3.12** 4.82*** 4.29*** 3.31** 4.11*** 1.85 3.05** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment announcements against individual measures of 
financial distress conditions and control variables, conditioned by debt capacity of the divesting firms. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
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Table 7 
Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and overlapping financial distress 
conditions 
 CAR 
Difference to no 
distress conditions 
sample 
CAR 
Difference to no 
distress conditions 
sample 
 Panel A: IND 1 Panel B: IND 2 
     
Firm, industry-wide and 
economy-wide distress 
1.12% 
(0.77) 
[122] 
0.18% 
(0.25) 
3.12% 
(2.54)** 
[23] 
2.19% 
(1.31) 
Firm and industry-wide 
distress 
0.54% 
(0.82) 
[185] 
-0.40% 
(-0.67) 
0.97% 
(1.23) 
[97] 
0.04% 
(0.04) 
Firm and economy-wide 
distress 
1.99% 
(2.77)*** 
[217] 
1.05% 
(1.91)* 
1.57% 
(3.97)*** 
[316] 
0.64% 
(1.35) 
Firm distress only 
0.76% 
(4.23)*** 
[1,928] 
-0.18% 
(-0.86) 
0.73% 
(6.52)*** 
[2,016] 
-0.20% 
(-1.00) 
Industry-wide and 
economy-wide distress 
-0.31% 
(-0.32) 
[189] 
-1.24% 
(-2.08)** 
-1.77% 
(-1.39) 
[38] 
-2.70% 
(-2.06)** 
Industry-wide distress only 
-0.57% 
(-0.97) 
[352] 
-1.50% 
(-3.39)*** 
-1.73% 
(-3.57)*** 
[188] 
-2.66% 
(-2.93)*** 
Economy-wide distress 
only 
1.19% 
(3.05)*** 
[549] 
0.25% 
(0.71) 
0.94% 
(3.29)*** 
[700] 
0.01% 
(0.03) 
No distress conditions 
0.93% 
(9.97)*** 
[7,176] 
 0.93% 
(15.11)*** 
[7,340] 
 
The table reports average thee-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment announcements 
categorized by overlapping financial distress conditions. CARs are measured over the three-day event window beginning 
one day prior to the announcement date, day zero. Measures of financial distress are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and the number of observations is shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 8 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and overlapping 
financial distress conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample CAPLO = 1 CAPLO = 0 Full Sample CAPLO = 1 CAPLO = 0 
 Panel A: IND 1 Panel B: IND 2 
FIRM + IND + ECON 0.0129 (0.91) 
0.0247 
(1.03) 
0.0023 
(0.17) 
0.0210 
(0.87) 
-0.0149 
(-0.76) 
0.0515 
(1.29) 
FIRM + IND 0.0017 (0.34) 
0.0104 
(1.16) 
-0.0091 
(-1.01) 
0.0076 
(1.13) 
0.0054 
(0.64) 
0.0023 
(0.35) 
FIRM + ECON 0.0093 (1.13) 
0.0325 
(1.80)* 
-0.0078 
(-0.74) 
0.0100 
(1.50) 
0.0320 
(2.39)** 
-0.0091 
(-1.28) 
FIRM -0.0009 (-0.43) 
0.0014 
(0.42) 
0.0008 
(0.29) 
-0.0008 
(-0.40) 
0.0026 
(0.75) 
-0.0001 
(-0.04) 
IND + ECON -0.0115 (-1.23) 
-0.0334 
(-1.68)* 
0.0068 
(0.53) 
-0.0320 
(-1.22) 
-0.0636 
(-0.95) 
0.0017 
(0.04) 
IND -0.0212 (-2.45)** 
-0.0374 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.0169 
(-2.53)** 
-0.0286 
(-2.24)** 
-0.0368 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.0296 
(-1.88)* 
ECON 0.0051 (1.31) 
0.0107 
(1.21) 
0.0030 
(0.49) 
0.0030 
(0.96) 
0.0037 
(0.57) 
0.0046 
(0.76) 
       
LN (FSIZE) -0.0024 (-3.70)*** 
-0.0035 
(-2.56)** 
-0.0021 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.0035 
(-2.61)** 
-0.0021 
(-2.76)*** 
MTB -0.0001 (-0.25) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
-0.0003 
(-1.90)* 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
0.0010 
(0.93) 
-0.0003 
(-1.92)* 
RELATE 0.0003 (0.20) 
-0.0031 
(-1.16) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.0003 
(0.16) 
-0.0033 
(-1.21) 
-0.0001 
(0.03) 
CLUSTER 0.0010 (0.50) 
0.0046 
(1.16) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
0.0013 
(0.64) 
0.0052 
(1.28) 
-0.0004 
(-0.18) 
Intercept 0.0406 (4.82)*** 
0.0533 
(2.99)*** 
0.0386 
(3.84)*** 
0.0400 
(4.78)*** 
0.0528 
(3.05)*** 
0.0378 
(3.79)*** 
Number of observations 9,713 3,235 4,761 9,713 3,235 4,761 
Adjusted-R2  0.008 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.024 0.012 
F-statistic 3.21*** 3.08*** 1.75* 4.43*** 8.17*** 2.32** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against overlapping financial distress conditions and control variables. To define overlapping financial 
distress conditions we use only the included dummy variables for each distress condition. For example, the coefficient 
FIRM + IND + ECON indicates that the divestment announcement took place under firm-level, industry-wide, and 
economy-wide financial distress conditions simultaneously. IND indicates that the divestment took place during 
industry-wide distress conditions, but the economy and the announcing firm were not distressed at the time of the 
announcement. Abnormal returns are tested against the group of announcements where the firm, the industry, and the 
economy are classified as not experiencing financial distress at the time of the announcement. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 
industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal return surrounding divestment announcements conditioned by firm size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Large Small Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  
FIRM 0.0019 (1.09) 
0.0012 
(0.30)       
IND 1   -0.0076 (-1.25) 
-0.0110 
(-2.19)**     
IND 2     -0.0113 (-1.25) 
-0.0194 
(-2.10)**   
ECON       -0.0031 (-1.08) 
0.0130 
(2.01)** 
         
LN (FSIZE) -0.0023 (-4.00)*** 
-0.0025 
(-1.26) 
-0.0022 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.0027 
(-1.34) 
-0.0022 
(-3.89)*** 
-0.0027 
(-1.35) 
-0.0023 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.0025 
(-1.23) 
MTB -0.0002 (-2.19)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
-0.0002 
(-2.35)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0002 
(-2.26)** 
-0.0000 
(-0.09) 
-0.0002 
(2.25)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
RELATE 0.0011 (0.50) 
-0.0002 
(-0.07) 
0.0012 
(0.54) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.0011 
(0.50) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
0.0012 
(0.56) 
-0.0003 
(-0.12) 
CLUSTER -0.0020 (-1.13) 
0.0034 
(1.11) 
-0.0023 
(-1.33) 
0.0034 
(1.08) 
-0.0021 
(-1.19) 
0.0036 
(1.15) 
-0.0021 
(-1.20) 
0.0033 
(1.07) 
Intercept 0.0414 (4.92)*** 
0.0406 
(1.74)* 
0.0409 
(5.06)*** 
0.0438 
(1.85)* 
0.0404 
(4.96)*** 
0.0434 
(1.86)* 
0.0417 
(4.93)*** 
0.0389 
(1.66) 
Number of 
observations 4,850 4,863 4,850 4,863 4,850 4,863 4,850 4,863 
Adjusted-R2  0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 
F-statistic 9.24*** 0.55 11.60*** 1.76 10.27*** 1.45 9.46*** 1.53 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables, conditioned by firm 
size. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors 
clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
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Table 10 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress 
conditioned by relatedness of divested asset and parent firm  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 RELATE = 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
FIRM 0.0035 (0.99) 
0.0003 
(0.14)       
IND 1   -0.0120 (-2.22)** 
-0.0068 
(-1.76)*     
IND 2     -0.0255 (-2.66)** 
-0.0092 
(-1.30)   
ECON       0.0020 (0.37) 
0.0071 
(1.60) 
         
LN (FSIZE) -0.0021 (-2.73)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.0021 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.0024 
(-2.86)*** 
MTB -0.0002 (-0.99) 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
-0.0002 
(-0.89) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
-0.0002 
(-0.89) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
-0.0002 
(-1.00) 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
CLUSTER 0.0010 (0.36) 
0.0012 
(0.46) 
0.0007 
(0.26) 
0.0012 
(0.45) 
0.0009 
(0.33) 
0.0013 
(0.49) 
0.0010 
(0.39) 
0.0012 
(0.45) 
Intercept 0.0367 (3.47)*** 
0.0408 
(3.88)*** 
0.0396 
(3.75)*** 
0.0415 
(3.90)*** 
0.0397 
(3.79)*** 
0.0413 
(3.88)*** 
0.0374 
(3.56)*** 
0.0399 
(3.73)*** 
Number of 
observations 3,869 5,844 3,869 5,844 3,869 5,844 3,869 5,844 
Adjusted-R2  0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006 
F-statistic 2.89** 4.11*** 4.20*** 4.20*** 5.06*** 4.16*** 2.37* 5.13*** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables, conditioned by the 
relatedness of the divested asset and parent firm. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 11 
Proportion of related divestments between buyer and selling firm conditioned on financial distress conditions 
 Distressed Non-distressed t-test difference 
Panel A: Seller unit – Buyer unit    
FIRM 0.3933 [3,087] 
0.3987 
[10,359] 0.5413 
IND1 0.3860 [1,070] 
0.3984 
[12,376] 0.8019 
IND2 0.3755 [514] 
0.3983 
[12,932] 1.0467 
ECON 0.3632 [1,382] 
0.4014 
[12,064] 2.7844*** 
    
Panel B: Seller unit – Buyer parent    
FIRM 0.3341 [3,047] 
0.3411 
[10,220] 0.7177 
IND1 0.3372 [1,047] 
0.3396 
[12,220] 0.1664 
IND2 0.3347 [505] 
0.3397 
[12,762] 0.2345 
ECON 0.3104 [1,350] 
0.3428 
[11,917] 2.4327** 
    
Panel C: Seller parent – Buyer unit    
FIRM 0.2710 [3,096] 
0.2629 
[10,369] -0.8912 
IND1 0.3016 [1,071] 
0.2616 
[12,394] -2.7450*** 
IND2 0.2802 [514] 
0.2641 
[12,951] -0.7923 
ECON 0.2715 [1,385] 
0.2640 
[12,080] -0.5940 
    
Panel D: Seller parent – Buyer parent    
FIRM 0.2569 [3,056] 
0.2497 
[10,229] -0.7998 
IND1 0.2923 [1,047] 
0.2478 
[12,238] -3.0443*** 
IND2 0.2911 [505] 
0.2498 
[12,780] -2.0066** 
ECON 0.2604 [1,352] 
0.2503 
[11,933] -0.7981 
The table reports the proportion of related divesting and acquiring firms/units where the divesting firm and or unit are 
identified as sharing the same 2-digit SIC code as the acquiring firm/unit and results are separated between financial 
distress and non-distress conditions. We identify SIC codes for the divesting firm/unit and acquiring firm/unit from 
SDC Platinum. Related divestments are identified as those where the seller and buyer share the same 2-digit SIC code. 
The proportion of total divestments that are related is reported above the number of observations in brackets. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 12 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements conditioned on buyer-
seller relatedness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Related Unrelated Related Unrelated Related Unrelated Related Unrelated 
Panel A: Seller unit – Buyer parent 
FIRM 0.0054 (1.83)* 
-0.0005 
(-0.17)       
IND1   -0.0098 (-1.58) 
-0.0088 
(-2.02)**     
IND2     -0.0060 (-0.54) 
-0.0207 
(-2.35)**   
ECON       -0.0029 (-0.53) 
0.0087 
(1.70)* 
LN (FSIZE) -0.0023 (-2.99)*** 
-0.0024 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.01)*** 
-0.0024 
(-2.79)*** 
MTB 0.0000 (0.00) 
-0.0002 
(-0.37) 
0.0000 
(0.11) 
-0.0002 
(-0.34) 
0.0000 
(0.03) 
-0.0002 
(-0.32) 
-0.0000 
(-0.02) 
-0.0002 
(-0.35) 
RELATE 0.0042 (1.53) 
-0.0017 
(-0.83) 
0.0046 
(1.65) 
-0.0016 
(-0.77) 
0.0043 
(1.56) 
-0.0018 
(-0.84) 
0.0043 
(1.57) 
-0.0020 
(-0.98) 
CLUSTER 0.0049 (1.47) 
-0.0010 
(-0.38) 
0.0048 
(1.44) 
-0.0011 
(-0.42) 
0.0049 
(1.47) 
-0.0008 
(-0.30) 
0.0049 
(1.48) 
-0.0010 
(-0.39) 
Intercept 0.0341 (3.23)*** 
0.0427 
(3.75)*** 
0.0367 
(3.49)*** 
0.0437 
(3.74)*** 
0.0356 
(3.36)*** 
0.0441 
(3.79)*** 
0.0355 
(3.39)*** 
0.0418 
(3.64)*** 
Number of 
observations 3,337 6,223 3,337 6,223 3,337 6,223 3,337 6,223 
Adjusted-R2  0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
F-statistic 2.323* 3.513*** 3.731*** 3.387*** 2.767** 3.570*** 3.067** 4.612*** 
 
Panel B: Seller unit – Buyer parent; Small firms only 
FIRM 0.0036 (0.71) 
0.0000 
(0.00)       
IND1   -0.0183 (-1.84)* 
-0.0076 
(-0.93)     
IND2     -0.0068 (-0.44) 
-0.0260 
(-1.81)*   
ECON       -0.0078 (-0.82) 
0.0219 
(2.71)*** 
LN (FSIZE) -0.0021 (-0.90) 
-0.0028 
(-1.16) 
-0.0025 
(-1.08) 
-0.0029 
(-1.18) 
-0.0022 
(-0.95) 
-0.0030 
(-1.24) 
-0.0021 
(-0.92) 
-0.0026 
(-1.08) 
MTB 0.0001 (0.53) 
-0.0002 
(-0.28) 
0.0002 
(0.81) 
-0.0002 
(-0.25) 
0.0002 
(0.58) 
-0.0001 
(-0.21) 
0.0001 
(0.51) 
-0.0002 
(-0.25) 
RELATE 0.0040 (0.79) 
-0.0017 
(-0.49) 
0.0047 
(0.95) 
-0.0016 
(-0.46) 
0.0041 
(0.81) 
-0.0017 
(-0.49) 
0.0042 
(0.85) 
-0.0019 
(-0.54) 
CLUSTER 0.0077 (1.77)* 
0.0011 
(0.29) 
0.0076 
(1.76)* 
0.0011 
(0.29) 
0.0078 
(1.78)* 
0.0015 
(0.40) 
0.0078 
(1.80)* 
0.0008 
(0.23) 
Intercept 0.0295 (1.03) 
0.0462 
(1.63) 
0.0357 
(1.26) 
0.0481 
(1.65) 
0.0315 
(1.11) 
0.0493 
(1.72)* 
0.0313 
(1.11) 
0.0421 
(1.48) 
Number of 
observations 1,567 3,261 1,567 3,261 1,567 3,261 1,567 3,261 
Adjusted-R2  0.004 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 
F-statistic 1.255 0.562 3.061** 0.618 1.719 1.032 1.583 2.343* 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements for small firms against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables, and 
conditioned by the relatedness of the buyer and seller of the assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 13 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements, deal size and financial 
distress conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FIRM 0.0017 (0.76)    
IND 1  -0.0024 (-0.61)   
IND 2   -0.0017 (-0.36)  
ECON    0.0096 (2.72)*** 
     
DSIZE 0.0206 (2.18)** 
0.0255 
(2.72)*** 
0.0188 
(1.70)* 
0.0217 
(2.47)** 
DSIZE * FIRM -0.0215 (-1.52) 
   
DSIZE * IND 1  -0.0490 (-2.16)***   
DSIZE * IND 2   -0.0350 (-1.30)  
DSIZE * ECON    -0.0554 (-1.44) 
     
LN (FSIZE) -0.0024 (-3.54)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.53)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.42)*** 
MTB -0.0002 (-1.25) 
-0.0002 
(-1.03) 
-0.0002 
(-1.15) 
-0.0002 
(-1.21) 
RELATE 0.0004 (0.31) 
0.0005 
(0.40) 
0.0003 
(0.22) 
0.0004 
(0.30) 
CLUSTER 0.0028 (1.29) 
0.0027 
(1.24) 
0.0028 
(1.33) 
0.0027 
(1.25) 
Intercept 0.0392 (4.42)*** 
0.0387 
(4.37)*** 
0.0394 
(4.34)*** 
0.0376 
(4.19)*** 
Number of observations 6,098 6,098 6,098 6,098 
Adjusted-R2  0.011 0.016 0.012 0.014 
F-statistic 3.10*** 3.28*** 2.81** 4.82*** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions, control variables, and deal size. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the 
Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Industry-wide distress and divestment announcements 
DS level 6 industry Industry code Count 
Fraction 
of sample IND 1 IND 2 
Exploration & Production 50 152 1.42% 1991, 1998, 2008 1998 
Integrated Oil & Gas 97 395 3.69% - - 
Oil Equipment & Services 51 71 0.66% 1992, 2002, 2008 2002 
Pipelines 52 0 0.00% - - 
Renewable Energy 
Equipment 74 2 0.02% 2008 - 
Alternative Fuels 83 2 0.02% 2007, 2008 - 
Commodity Chemicals 92 95 0.89% - - 
Specialty Chemicals 33 462 4.31% 2008 - 
Forestry 38 3 0.03% - - 
Paper 82 21 0.20% 2008 - 
Aluminum 93 0 0.00% - - 
Nonferrous Metals 54 6 0.06% 2008 - 
Iron & Steel 56 48 0.45% 2008 2008 
Coal 49 14 0.13% 2008 - 
Diamonds & Gemstones 89 4 0.04% 2008 2008 
General Mining 122 320 2.99% 1990, 1992, 2008 1990 
Gold Mining 119 28 0.26% 1988, 1990, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2008 2001 
Platinum & Precious Metals 78 55 0.51% 2008 2008 
Building Materials & Fixtures 30 470 4.38% 2008 - 
Heavy Construction 39 138 1.29% 2008 - 
Aerospace 98 113 1.05% 2008 - 
Defense 44 89 0.83% - - 
Containers & Packaging 70 113 1.05% 1998, 2008 2008 
Diversified Industrials 101 187 1.74% - - 
Electrical Components & 
Equipment 37 165 1.54% 2001, 2008 2001 
Electronic Equipment 57 183 1.71% 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 - 
Commercial Vehicles & 
Trucks 117 21 0.20% 1990, 2008 - 
Industrial Machinery 43 588 5.49% 2008 2008 
Delivery Services 40 9 0.08% 1990, 2001 - 
Marine Transportation 99 47 0.44% 2008 - 
Railroads 81 0 0.00% - - 
Transportation Services 64 171 1.60% 2008 - 
Trucking 131 38 0.35% - - 
Business Support Services 86 635 5.92% 2008 - 
Business Training & 
Employment Agencies 134 100 0.93% 1990, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
Financial Administration 46 54 0.50% 2008 - 
Industrial Suppliers 32 92 0.86% 2008 2008 
Waste & Disposal Services 47 30 0.28% 2008 2008 
Automobiles 65 3 0.03% 1990, 2008 1990 
Auto Parts 63 123 1.15% 2002, 2008 2002 
Tires 53 0 0.00% - - 
Brewers 67 54 0.50% - - 
Distillers & Vintners 68 140 1.31% 2006 - 
Soft Drinks 114 2 0.02% - - 
Farming & Fishing 35 24 0.22% 2008 - 
Food Products 71 795 7.42% 2008 - 
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Durable Household Products 59 43 0.40% 1998, 2008 1998 
Nondurable Household 
Products 62 64 0.60% 2007, 2008 - 
Furnishings 60 71 0.66% 2004, 2008 - 
Home Construction 36 113 1.05% 1990, 2008 1990, 2008 
Consumer Electronics 75 49 0.46% 2008 - 
Recreational Products 155 11 0.10% 2000 - 
Toys 61 6 0.06% 1990, 1997, 2000, 2008 - 
Clothing & Accessories 69 213 1.98% 1990, 2008 2008 
Footwear 153 2 0.02% - - 
Personal Products 48 16 0.15% - - 
Tobacco 79 92 0.86% - - 
Health Care Providers 45 26 0.24% 2002, 2008, 2011 - 
Medical Equipment 132 105 0.98% 2002, 2008 2002, 2008 
Medical Supplies 103 19 0.18% 2001, 2007, 2008 2001, 2007 
Biotechnology 157 76 0.71% 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008 1998, 2002, 2008 
Pharmaceuticals 95 187 1.74% 2008 - 
Drug Retailers 120 46 0.43% - - 
Food Retailers & 
Wholesalers 88 120 1.12% 2008 - 
Apparel Retailers 66 133 1.24% 1990, 1998, 2008 2008 
Broadline Retailers 87 59 0.55% 2008 - 
Home Improvement 
Retailers 85 52 0.49% 1998, 2008 - 
Specialized Consumer 
Services 156 10 0.09% 2000, 2001, 2008 2001 
Specialty Retailers 90 371 3.46% 2008 - 
Broadcasting & 
Entertainment 115 273 2.55% 1990, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
Media Agencies 41 202 1.88% 1990, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001 
Publishing 84 439 4.10% 2001, 2008 2008 
Airlines 129 56 0.52% 1992, 2008 - 
Gambling 100 121 1.13% 2001, 2006, 2008 2006 
Hotels 80 227 2.12% 1990, 2008 - 
Recreational Services 55 191 1.78% 1990, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2008 1992 
Restaurants & Bars 72 256 2.39% 2008 - 
Travel & Tourism 94 84 0.78% 2008 - 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 142 145 1.35% 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 2000, 2002 
Mobile Telecommunications 143 86 0.80% 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
Computer Services 150 185 1.73% 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 2000, 2002, 2008 
Internet 151 31 0.29% 2000, 2001, 2002 - 
Software 58 332 3.10% 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 2000, 2002 
Computer Hardware 34 20 0.19% 1990, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001 
Electronic Office Equipment 105 13 0.12% - - 
Semiconductors 130 10 0.09% 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 - 
Telecommunications 
Equipment 126 101 0.94% 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
The table presents the number of divestments by Datastream level 6 industry groups for a sample of divestment 
announcements by UK firms from 1988 to 2009. The sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE 
All-Share Index of the London Stock Exchange.  
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Appendix B 
Probit selection models of the probability of divesting assets 
 (1) (2) 
FIRM -0.1208 (-3.04)*** 
-0.1447 
(-3.52)*** 
IND 1 -0.3574 (-5.06)***  
IND 2  -0.3900 (-4.02)*** 
ECON -0.0807 (-3.26)*** 
-0.1359 
(-6.19)*** 
   
LN (FSIZE) -0.0978 (-4.79)*** 
-0.0973 
(-4.75)*** 
CAPLO 0.1521 (4.36)*** 
0.1495 
(4.27)*** 
NON CASH WC -0.0664 (-2.86)*** 
-0.0646 
(-2.80)*** 
PE -0.0001 (-1.32) 
-0.0001 
(-1.32) 
MTB -0.0009 (-2.85)*** 
-0.0009 
(-2.95)*** 
SALES GROWTH -0.0034 (-1.17) 
-0.0033 
(-1.18) 
ROA 0.1207 (3.12)*** 
0.1280 
(3.18)*** 
Intercept -0.7454 (-5.75)*** 
-0.7595 
(-5.83)*** 
Number of observations 51,984 51,952 
Pseudo R2  0.017 0.014 
Log pseudo likelihood  -14621.53 -14664.608 
Wald χ2 92.47*** 129.65*** 
The table reports probit regressions of the likelihood of divesting assets for a sample of divestment announcements by 
UK firms from 1988 to 2009. The sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms. The dependent variable is set 
equal to one if the firm announces a divestment in the subsequent financial year, and zero otherwise. NONCASH WC is 
current assets minus cash divided by current liabilities. PE is year-end share price divided by earnings per share. SALES 
GROWTH is the change in revenue over the subsequent financial year. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by book value of total assets. All remaining variables are defined 
in Table 1. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 
industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 
